What are the benefits and effects of maritime security strategies? Should South Africa develop one? These were the two key questions that were addressed in a webinar organized by the Sigla (University of Stellenbosch) and the Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria). Titled the “Perspectives on an Integrated Maritime Security Strategy for South Africa” the event featured Professor Francois Vrey (Sigla), Rear Admiral D. Mkhonto (South African Navy), Timothy Walker (ISS), Dr. Lisa Otto (U Johannesburg), Dr. Ali Kamal-Deen (CEMLAWS) and Dave O’Connell (UNODC).
On the 4.3. I had the pleasure to speak at the Pathfinder Indian Ocean Security Conference. The conference is part of the long term endeavor of the Pathfinder Foundation for a high quality discussion on the future of the security architecture of the Indian Ocean. The conference focused on confidence building measures, options for improving the current institutions and Maritime Domain Awareness with speakers from the region, China, the U.S., Russia, and Europe.
I addressed the audience as part of the panel on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). In my short intervention I flagged the importance of having good knowledge of the sea by sharing information on an everyday basis. I argued that MDA is important for three reasons. 1) it provides a measure for trust and confidence building; 2) it enables and coordinates rapid transnational operational responses to maritime incidents which not only includes crimes, such as piracy, but also environmental incidents, such as oil spills; 3) it allows for a common understanding of what the key security problems at sea actually are.
In the light of the ongoing turn to geopolitical thinking and naval competition, in particular the third rationale for MDA seems to be important. MDA might be here a key instrument to manage the emerging militarization dilemma in the region. As we show in a forthcoming article, co-authored with Jan Stockbruegger, the Indian Ocean is increasingly confronted with such a dilemma, where on the one side more naval force is needed to deal with maritime crimes, while on the other growth of naval employment within geo-political strategies re-enforces tensions.
I also recommended that more attention is payed to what kind of information is actually shared through MDA. Here we need to go beyond AIS data, and consider satellite imagery or remote sensing data. Also algorithms that are effective in identifying suspicious maritime behavior should be shared, and categorizations of issues, threats, and suspicious behavior should be harmonized.
The SafeSeas team held meetings with partners in Lisbon on the 1st and 2nd of March. We first had a meeting with the Atlantic Center a key new knowledge production and capacity building initiative of Portugal’s Ministry of Defense. SafeSeas is in the process of forming a partnership with the Center to discuss strategic issues, such as subsea infrastructures, but also to work together in capacity building and the maritime security academy. We also visited the Maritime Operations Center of the Portuguese Navy which is the country’s maritime domain awareness center that integrates and coordinates search and rescue, border, police and other maritime functions.
In the afternoon we visited the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) headquarter. We received a briefing on EMSA’s surveillance work and how it uses satellite data and discussed the future of the agency in the EU’s overall maritime governance architecture. We also met with the UNODC’s Global Maritime Crime Programme’s local representative.
On the 28.2. we held the kick off meeting of our new research project on Ocean Infrastructure. The project is a collaboration between the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and the Ocean Governance group of the Helmholtz Center for Functional Marine Biodiversity (Germany). It is a four year project funded by the Velux Foundation to explore the role of different infrastructures in the governance of the oceans. In the project we investigate infrastructures that ensure freedom of navigation, routing schemes, environmental protection (e.g. oil spills) and subsea cable networks. After an initiation phase we will start our work in summer 2022, and our starting conference will be held in October 2022.
I argue that subsea infrastructure is too often a neglected object on both the maritime security and cyber security agendas, although it is vital for the digital economy. I discuss some of the threats to the infrastructure as well as ideas of how the cables might be better protected. The presentation draws on the research on subsea data cables that I am currently carrying out with Tobias Liebetrau, and that is also one workstream in the Ocean Infrastructures project. The recording of the event is available here, with my talk starting at
This week the term starts at the University of Copenhagen and over the next weeks I am teaching a new iteration of my course on maritime security. In the course we revisit the basics of maritime security, by investigating its history, complexity, before turning to the role of different actors and the genuine responses one finds implemented (e.g. maritime domain awareness, maritime security strategies, capacity building).
As in earlier iterations, participants in the course also conduct a small scale research project on maritime security which will lead to new Wikipedia entries on maritime security being published.
In a new commentary published in the Seychelles Research Journal I discuss what impact the rise of thinking in terms of the Indo-Pacific might have for islands. I argue that the geopolitical thinking implied by the new region will make it difficult for small islands to position themselves. I draw on the case of Seychelles to lay out the challenges ahead. The short piece will be interesting for those concerned about small state diplomacy and the debate on the Indo-Pacific.
Since more than a decade the international Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) has been one of the guardians of maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean. An informal governance forum with a direct link to the UN Security Council the group has been the key platform for strategizing the response to piracy among the international community. Bringing together senior diplomats, international and regional organizations, the industry, NGOs and academics, the success in containing piracy in the region can be directly attributed to the group.
I have been following the work of the group very closely, first, in leading on a Lessons Learned Project for the group, then as a strategy advisor for the chairmanship of the Republic of Seychelles (2016-2017). In 2019 we produced a strategic review of the group, which was discussed at a meeting co-hosted by the University of Copenhagen, Danish Shipping and the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More recently I have been involved as an expert in the Strategic Planning Steering Group, supporting the chair, that produced a new strategic vision for the platform.
The Contact Group has been grappling over the last years with its future role, considering the international consent that piracy off the coast of Somalia has been contained but not eradicated, and that there continues to be a risk of a large scale return of pirate operations threatening international transport. Gradually the group has reduced its work, in the light of the declining threat. It delegated some of its core functions, including the coordination of legal harmonization, capacity building or operations at sea to other regional entities, yet maintains an annual plenary at which the risk of piracy is discussed. This remains important not the least to ensure ongoing awareness for the risk of piracy in the region.
On the 27th of January the group is scheduled to hold its next plenary in hybrid format under the current chair the Republic of Kenya. I very much look forward to attend and follow the debates. The key issue on the agenda is the future role of the group in addressing maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean region. We can expect a debate on changing the name of the group and on different ways of how to broaden the focus on other blue crimes. This is not necessarily an easy challenge, given the number of institutions and organizations already active in addressing those issues, there is hence a risk of duplication, and the Contact Group needs to specify what it can actually add to these efforts.
What are the opportunities and challenges for small island state foreign policy in the changing world political environment? This was the key question that I explored at a talk at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Seychelles on the 20th of December. The event was hosted by the minister who gave a short welcome address.
In my talk I started in revisiting an article on the Seychelles co-authored with Anders Wivel. In the article we explored how Seychelles has managed to gain a global reputation and status despites its very low capacity. As we argued this can be explained by the ways that the country adopts productively the principles of smart small state foreign policy and by its style of diplomacy of diplomacy driven by pluralism and pragmatism – what we dubbed ‘creole diplomacy’.
On this basis, I discussed current world political master trends that are likely to influence the status and diplomatic action space of Seychelles, emphasizing 1) the return of geopolitics, in particular given the rise of Indo-Pacific thinking, 2) the rise of informal governance and 3) the ocean revolution. Each of these trends creates new challenges and opportunities. The analysis is forthcoming as a short article in the Seychelles Research Journal.
Based on this analysis I made five proposals for how Seychelles can seize opportunities and continue its entrepreneurial style of diplomacy. Firstly, Seychelles should look east and strengthen its bilateral relations to Maldives and Sri Lanka, but also seize opportunities to work closer with Southeast Asia and the islands of the South Pacific.
Second, the government would benefit from issuing a paper in which it outlines its own understanding of the Indo-Pacific, the role of Seychelles therein, and its vision for the future of this regional construct.
Thirdly, the country could benefit from better coordinating its ocean-related diplomacy under the notion of ‘blue diplomacy’. This could entail the creation of the post of an ocean ambassador who coordinates participation in ocean summits, adds a face to Seychelles ocean politics and speaks on behalf of Seychellois marine life.
Fourthly, I argued for the need to continue strong advocacy and campaigning work on core ocean issues. This could particularly focus on three issues: Plastic pollution and the global campaign against plastics; the prevention of and response to shipping accidents, that requires more surveillance of shipping activities but also capacity building on a regional level; and supporting the ban of deep sea mineral mining.
Fifthly, I suggested that Seychelles can draw on its reputation as an innovator in developing the blue economy and maritime security agendas to drive forward the discussion of how synergies between both can be build.
The event continued with a discussion of creole diplomacy, the implications of the Indo-Pacific construct for Seychelles and which issues the foreign policy might want to focus on.
