Christian Bueger

Category Archives: Comment


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A Contact Group for the Strait of Hormuz?

The question of how to restore safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most pressing issues for the global economy.

Much of the debate has focused on the control system Iran intends to establish and the role the United States may play, with the U.S. President indicating a willingness to collaborate. Whatever the outcome, uncertainty is likely to remain high, suggesting that these arrangements alone may not be sufficient to alter the risk assessments of the shipping industry.

This underscores the continued importance of exploring whether and how multilateral arrangements can contribute. More than 30 states have expressed their willingness to support a multilateral solution and have begun coordinating their positions.

The UN Security Council, which could provide both mandate and legitimacy for such an endeavor, has so far been unable to reach agreement. A draft resolution by Bahrain calling for close coordination among affected states was put to a vote on the 7th of April, but China and Russia exercised their vetoes, citing concerns that the proposed authorizations could be misinterpreted and risk further escalation. Discussions in the Council are expected to continue.

A more practical question therefore arises: if a coalition of over 30 states seeks to act, what form could this take? A central element would be an international coordination mechanism. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has proposed the establishment of an international contact group.

Contact groups are proven crisis management instruments

Contact groups are a proven instrument in international crisis management and have demonstrated their value in maritime contexts. Notably, much of the success in countering piracy off the coast of Somalia between 2008 and 2012 can be attributed to the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).

Their utility lies in enabling strategic alignment, operational coordination, the development of legal pathways, and the preparation of decisions within formal international organizations. They help depoliticize cooperation by focusing on concrete, manageable issues, thereby limiting the impact of broader geopolitical tensions.

They are also agile and impose a relatively low administrative burden. Their flexible participation formats allow for engagement with industry and civil society ensuring that relevant expertise is incorporated.

How the group could work in practice

A Contact Group for the Strait of Hormuz could be mandated to serve several purposes:

  • To provide reassurance to the shipping industry and help stabilize risk assessments;
  • to deter hostile actions and provocations against shipping, including in the cyber and subsea domains;
  • to ensure the Strait remains free of mine-related risks;
  • to coordinate and deconflict naval operations among participating states
  • to address divergences in the interpretation of the law of the sea
  • to support long-term safety arrangements, including consideration of a dedicated treaty
  • to identify solutions for recovering the maritime ecosystems from war-related pollution

Broad but functional participation will be essential. This could include:

  • States with a high interest in freedom of navigation in the Strait, and states that currently operate naval forces in the region, including through multi-national naval forces (e.g. EUNVAFOR Operation Atalanta, or Combined Maritime Forces);
  • international shipping industry associations, including International Chamber of Shipping, BIMCO, INTERTANKO, and INTERCARGO;
  • international organizations with a relevant mandate, including the International Maritime Organization (IMO), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UN Environment Programme, UN Institute for Disarmament Research, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), World Food Programme (WFP);
  • regional organizations active in maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, European Union, Djibouti Code of Conduct, and Indian Ocean Commission
  • selected non-governmental organizations, including seafarer organizations, as appropriate.

Drawing on the CGPCS model, the group could be structured around a plenary and several technical working groups. A plenary with a rotating chair, meeting quarterly, could provide strategic direction and issue communiqués to enhance transparency. Possible technical working groups could focus on operational naval coordination and deconfliction (WG1), information sharing, industry engagement and communication (WG2), legal harmonization, bringing together law of the sea experts from foreign ministries (WG3), and environmental challenges arising from the war (WG4).

Given that the United Kingdom has already convened a group of states, it could take the lead in establishing the contact group and proposing initial terms of reference, drawing on the CGPCS experience. While a Security Council mandate would be desirable, there is no need to wait for one—though efforts to secure such a mandate should continue.


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A moment of relief: What’s next for the Strait of Hormuz?

The decision by the United States not to further escalate its conflict with Iran, alongside a two-week ceasefire, has offered the global economy a brief moment of relief. Both sides have declared victory. Yet as details of the agreement slowly emerge—and remain subject to further negotiation—it is clear that the outlook for global trade is mixed.

A temporary arrangement has been reached for the Strait of Hormuz, one of the central arteries of the global economy. This narrow waterway is critical not only for energy flows but also for the food security of billions. What happens here reverberates far beyond the region.

Since the onset of hostilities involving the United States and Israel, Iran has exercised tight control over navigation through the strait. It has threatened to target vessels linked to its adversaries while guaranteeing safe passage to only a limited number of ships, primarily those transporting Iranian oil to Asia. In practice, the strait has been neither fully closed nor fully open.

The ceasefire appears to ease immediate tensions. Iran is expected to lift its direct threats against commercial shipping. However, it will retain significant control over access. Rather than restoring full freedom of navigation, the emerging “new normal” places decisions over passage largely at Iran’s discretion.

Tehran has also indicated its intention to impose transit fees as a means of compensation for the war. While international law does not permit direct charges for passage, it does allow fees for services rendered (see UNCLOS para. 26). This legal grey area could provide Iran with substantial leverage. Much will depend on the details—particularly the criteria used to determine which vessels are allowed to transit and under what conditions. For now, those rules remain opaque.

A process at the International Maritime Organization will likely be required to puzzle out the details and offer the industry reassurance. How this impacts the risk assessments of the shipping industry remains to be seen. Many shippers are likely to pause their transits and wait to see how the situation develops.

Higher transit costs, increased insurance premiums, and persistent uncertainty will likely raise the price of shipping. Countries heavily dependent on this route will bear the burden, effectively absorbing part of the economic cost of the conflict and essentially paying for Trump’s war.

Diplomatically, the ceasefire marks a success for regional actors, notably Pakistan, which acted as the facilitator, backed by its partners Egypt, Turkiye and Saud Arabia – increasingly known as the Muslim Quad. We are likely to hear more from this new grouping and its strategy not only in the Gulf but also in the broader Indian Ocean.

At the same time, we are facing a moment that underscores the weakening of the multilateral system. The UN Security Council met only hours before the ceasefire was agreed to vote on a resolution that would have implied a broader global agreement for the Strait of Hormuz.

It would have provided the foundation for a multilateral mechanism, such as a contact group, that could provide safety in the Strait in the long run. China and Russia used their veto. The failure to adopt a broader agreement highlights growing geopolitical fragmentation. Yet, a Security Council resolution is not fully off the table. After this failure, restarting negotiations will require some time.

The result is not a return to normality, but the emergence of a more politicized and fragile maritime environment—one in which chokepoints are increasingly weaponized and politically controlled. Freedom of navigation will become more and more limited.


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Upcoming UN Security Council resolution on Strait of Hormuz

The first UN Security Council resolution (2817) on the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz was historic: 135 states sponsored the document calling for an end to attacks on shipping. Ten days of intense negotiations later, the Council is expected to vote on a follow-up resolution today.

According to the Security Council Report, the resolution calls on states “to coordinate efforts, defensive in nature, commensurate to the circumstances, to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels, and to deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation”.

That means that the Council will not explicitly authorize the use of force, as some states called for. Its focus on defensive measures is useful, as it does not risk escalation.

The resolution will serve as a solid foundation for a future arrangement for governing the strait, which can be put in place once a ceasefire is agreed. This will be led by the 40-nation-plus coalition of states that have already agreed to contribute to the protection of shipping in the region.

A contact group will likely be the best format to organize the coalition, to enhance military coordination, coordination with the shipping industry, and to harmonize legal understandings.

As I have argued in a recent commentary for EUobserver, the EU could play a leading role, given its experience with organizing multilateral naval operations, and the strong information-sharing infrastructure it has in place.

All of this only can be activated once hostilities end. It’s important to have solid planning already now.


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The maritime security council: new commentary

The 2025 UN Security Council presents an unprecedented opportunity for global maritime security, as I explore in my latest commentary for United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

🔊 The incoming Council membership – featuring Greece (controlling 17% of global maritime capacity), Denmark (home to Maersk), Panama (world’s largest flag state), Pakistan (regional naval power), and Somalia (maritime security success story) – creates a unique concentration of maritime expertise alongside the permanent members.

💡 This “de facto Maritime Security Council” arrives at a critical moment. From attacks on commercial shipping to cybersecurity threats and environmental challenges, maritime security threats are evolving at an unprecedented pace. No nation can ensure maritime security alone.

Key questions for the Council to discuss:
🔎 Establishing a dedicated maritime security mechanism within the UN system
🔎 Improving frameworks for information sharing and protecting critical maritime infrastructure
🔎 Addressing and coordinating responses to environmental threats in maritime domains

➡️ Read my full analysis on how this unique Council composition could reshape global maritime security governance here.


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News from the Western Indian Ocean maritime security. A visit to SHADE

🌊 The maritime security architecture in the Western Indian Ocean has developed new pace since the emergence of Houthi attacks on commercial shipping and the resurgence of Somali piracy activities last year. This week I attended the naval coordination SHADE conference in Bahrain, where these critical developments took center stage.

SHADE in full work mode

🤝 SHADE serves as a vital interface between the complex network of multinational and independent naval forces and the shipping industry. The EU’s Operation Atalanta and the US led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) co-host this forum which has evolved from its original focus on piracy to become a comprehensive annual dialogue.

📊 It has now upscaled activities and launched three working groups dedicated to intelligence, information sharing, and operations. The key objectives are to give better advice to shipping, improve flow of information, and develop better emergency response coordination, including oil spill prevention.

SHADE is working towards what it calls a ‘Single Information Environment’. This could streamline information flow across the six information sharing centers focused on the region. A corner piece is a center started in 2024 – the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) – which supports the CMF.

The European Union’s continued commitment

🇪🇺 The European Union continues to demonstrate strong commitment to regional maritime security. Operation Atalanta’s mandate has been renewed for two years, and its sister operation, Aspides, is expected to be extended until 2026.

There are expectations that the two EU operations will be merged soon. Anticipating this merger, the EU has rebranded its information sharing center. It now runs under the name of Maritime Security Center Indian Ocean (MSCIO), serves both operations and has a brand new website.

CMF and regional contributions

🌏 CMF, which is organized in different task forces and remains focused on nonstate threats on the high seas, has expanded its membership significantly, turning it into an important umbrella organization under US leadership.

🌏 Regional leadership in maritime security has also grown impressively: India has emerged as a pivotal maritime security provider; the Indian Ocean Commission’s two centers have become key operational pillars, coordinating responses among Eastern African states; and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCOC) has evolved into a more effective capacity building coordination mechanism.

⚓ As I highlighted in my presentation: Though this new momentum is encouraging, maritime security threats persist, and shipping attacks continue to pose challenges. Success requires sustained engagement and investment with a long-term perspective.


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Navigating complexity in Western Indian Ocean maritime security – new article

My latest analysis, published with the Center for Maritime Strategy, highlights the intricate web of maritime security challenges in the Western Indian Ocean. From piracy to drug trafficking, the region faces diverse threats requiring coordinated international response. Despite numerous initiatives, a cohesive security architecture remains elusive due to competing visions and priorities among stakeholders.

I emphasize the crucial role of the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities (CGIMA) as a neutral platform for strategic dialogue. While a unified structure is unlikely, CGIMA offers hope for better coordination and inclusivity. The goal: navigate complexity through open communication and collaboration, ensuring a safer Western Indian Ocean through collective action.


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The Royal Navy’s Quest for Seapower in the 21st Century – A conference visit

The First Sea Lord’s Seapower Conference is the Royal Navy’s annual flagship event, and I had the pleasure to attend and speak at this years iteration.

The 2024 edition was titled “Future navy: Maritime in the 2040s” and the debate firmly focused on the question of what mid-term challenges the Royal Navy faces and through what posture it could address them.

The event was co-organized with the Council on Geostrategy. The Council, founded in 2001, is a relatively young think tanks — if compared to the traditional British intellectual power houses, such as RUSI or Chatham House. The Council’s mission is “to strengthen Britain and re-assert [its] leadership” and it wants to “promote robust ideas” to boost the countries “discursive, diplomatic and military power”.

Continue reading →


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Why navies need to coordinate better in the Western Indian Ocean – new commentary

In a new commentary published with RUSI, I argue that the number of multi-national operations in the Western Indian Ocean region requires better coordination. I show which operations are currently active, and that new coordination tools, such as an improved SHADE mechanism are required. Read it here.


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Are the pirates of Somalia back in business?

In a new commentary published with SafeSeas I reflect on the current wave of piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia. The pirates have shown considerable activity over the past weeks, and use the current Red Sea crisis as a window of opportunity. Contrary to optimistic voices that suggest that the current counter-piracy structures can cope with this, I take a more critical stance, and argue that a strong signal is required to prevent further escalation.