Christian Bueger


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PhD Defense in Stockholm

How can theories of practice shed light on the propagation of disinformation? This was the central question that Johanna Muhrbeck investigated in her PhD thesis at the Swedish Defense University.

On Friday, 11th, I had the pleasure to discuss the thesis as the ‘opponent’ during the public defense. We discussed how Ted Schatzki’s theory of practice can be used in empirical research and what fascinating messy and organic account of disinformation can be developed from there. Many congratulations to Dr. Muhrbeck for a great piece of work!


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Conference of the European International Studies Association (EISA)

The conference of EISA is the annual premier event for scholars working in the discipline of International Relations. This year’s conference was held in Lisbon, and brought more than one thousand scholars from Europe, but also from Australia, Southeast Asia, Africa and the North America together.

I had the pleasure to participate in three panels at the event focused on theories of practice and contemporary infrastructure debates. At the first roundtable we discussed Eva Johais‘ forthcoming book titled ‘Practicing Electoral Assistance’, a fascinating ethnographic exploration of a key international practice published with Michigan University Press.

I also participated in two roundtables on contemporary infrastructure studies, one of which focused on a recent forum published in International Political Sociology edited by Jutta Bakonyi. The second roundtable discussed the current draft of our book titled ” The Engineered Ocean. Global Politics in an Age of Infrastructure”, which is the main output of the Ocean Infrastructure Research Group at the University of Copenhagen.


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Plenary of the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities (CGIMA)

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has brought new uncertainty and rising levels of maritime insecurity to the Western Indian Ocean.

The pirates of Somalia have resumed their activities, navies are more focused on other challenges than blue crimes in the region, and the future strength of the Combined Maritime Forces — one of the primary regional maritime security operations — is uncertain.

Under such conditions, established maritime security institutions are more important than ever. On Friday, 24.7.2026, the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities (CGIMA) held a plenary meeting in hybrid format in Mauritius.

As I have frequently highlighted in analytical pieces and commentaries, the Group — successor to the highly successful Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia — is potentially an important building block in the region’s maritime security architecture.

So far, however, it has struggled to fulfill this role. The Group, currently chaired by Seychelles and supported by a secretariat at the Indian Ocean Commission, did not respond, for instance, to the recent piracy resurgence.

Hopefully the plenary meeting will add some new momentum to the Group, complementing what is being achieved within the Djibouti Code of Conduct, the Regional Maritime Security Architecture, and formats such as SHADE.

Learn more about why CGIMA matters, and what it needs to do, in the video of my brief intervention at the plenary.


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Lectures at Naval War College, Goa

India is a growing naval power and increasingly important in providing maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean.

The Indian Naval War College, based in Goa, is an important part of the nation’s maritime strategy, delivering senior officer education not just for the Indian Navy and Coast Guard, but also for countries across the region.

Over the last few days I had the pleasure of discussing the state of maritime security with the college’s staff. I also delivered a series of lectures for the students based on our book, Understanding Maritime Security.

The discussions with students and staff provided useful food for thought — both for our work on the second edition, and for making sense of the rise of grey-zone strategies at sea. It was also great to learn about the college’s ambitions around internationalisation, as well as its research on the future role of navies.

The pleasures Goa has to offer — great food, Portuguese-inflected charm, and beautiful beaches, even in the rainy monsoon season — will certainly help turn the college into a new hub for naval thought.

Big thanks to the college for the invitation and hospitality.


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Maritime security engagements in Singapore

What are the key maritime security centers of the world? Singapore is clearly one of them. Institutions such as the Navy’s Information Fusion Centre (IFC) or the RSIS think tank‘s maritime security programme are major hubs for the international debate.

Over the last few days I was back in the city for discussions on the Strait of Hormuz crisis and for IFC’s annual flagship capacity-building programme, the Regional Maritime Security Practitioners Programme (RMPP). It was illuminating to discuss what the current Strait of Hormuz crisis means for Southeast Asia, for Singapore’s shipping industry, and for maritime security more broadly.

On one side, the growing shift toward grey-zone tactics at sea, the decline of traditional naval hegemony, and the new politicisation of strategic waterways are unsettling trends that demand sharper analytical tools. On the other side, the shipping industry remains remarkably resilient, and new thinking on maritime security and peace is gaining real momentum.

🙏 Big thanks to the Danish Embassy and Jakob Brix Tange for hosting a dinner with shipping industry representatives, to Darshana Mozinder Baruah and International Institute for Strategic Studies for organizing an afternoon seminar on the Hormuz crisis, and to RSIS and IFC for flying me in and giving me the chance to discuss maritime security trends with the RMPP participants.

It was also a privilege to witness the 50th anniversary of IFC’s Shared Awareness Meeting, one of Southeast Asia’s premier exchanges on the state of maritime security and what it means for industry. Digital interference — the jamming and spoofing of navigational signals — was the biggest concern raised this time.

Also wonderful to catch up with so many old friends in the maritime field. I already look forward to return to Singapore next year.


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A review of EU maritime security – talk in Dublin

What’s the state of play of EU maritime security policy?

Ireland, which holds the presidency of the European Council until the end of the year, has made maritime security a priority. The country invited me to give a talk last week to reflect on this question and provide a strategic review.

This was a great opportunity to revisit the assessment I did with Tim Edmunds, published three years ago in the Naval War College Review. What has changed?

On one side, not that much. The EU continues to grapple with the strategic challenges we set out in 2023: the plethora of strategic documents — now joined by the 2024 EU Maritime Strategy and the European Ocean Pact — still doesn’t give clear direction or harmonise efforts; interagency coordination remains less developed than it could be; and capacity-building efforts are still fragmented across a growing multitude of projects with 3-5 year lifespans. Most EU operations are running at capacity and facing real constraints, a problem that has become more acute since the launch of Aspides in 2024.

On the other side, the context of maritime security has shifted profoundly with the arrival of the age of grey-zone tactics. Critical maritime infrastructure protection has broadened the agenda and led to a flurry of activity, such as the EU’s subsea cable action plan. Maritime cybersecurity challenges are on the rise. The crises in the Red Sea and, later, the Strait of Hormuz have turned the sea into a far more volatile environment.

Perhaps most problematic in light of these developments: the EU has started to abandon its ambition to be a “global maritime security provider.” Much of current maritime security policy is inward-looking — concerned with European waters rather than the stability of the global maritime domain.

Yet at a time when the United States’ role as guarantor of global maritime security is increasingly questioned, it is vital that the EU sustains its ambitions. One way forward is to breathe new life into emerging partnerships — with the Nordic-Baltic 8++, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Türkiye, and India.

The EU could also show more leadership in multilateral processes: the UN Security Council debate on a global maritime security structure, advancing the law of naval warfare, addressing sea mine proliferation, and related areas.


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Meetings on the Strait of Hormuz crisis

Navigation through the Strait of Hormuz continues to be volatile. While the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Iran and the United States has provided some structure to the discussion, recent attacks indicate that escalation can return at any time. Key open questions concern how to design a future transit regime for the Strait that addresses the needs of all stakeholders without challenging prevalent understandings of the law of the sea. I had the pleasure to discuss these questions at two recent high-level events in Geneva and Brussels.

The second Geneva Maritime Roundtable, which I co-organized with Zoltán Turbék, was again generously hosted by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and brought more than 25 representatives from embassies, the transport industry, NGOs, and UN agencies together. It confirmed Geneva’s role as a hub for maritime governance and diplomacy, home to important stakeholders in the sector.

The other event was a high-level briefing organized by the European Commission’s DG IDEA, focused on how the EU can address the conflict and what to prioritize in its partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Both events surfaced a consistent set of priorities:

(1) The debate on the future of transit through the Strait requires a structured political process — such as a Dialogue or Contact Group — in which the full spectrum of issues can be discussed at both diplomatic and technical levels. This would ideally lead to a sustainable governance mechanism for the Strait, including agreed interpretations of the law of the sea, a dispute settlement mechanism and attention to environmental concerns.

(2) The question of how mine clearance will be conducted and how the area can be declared mine-free is critical for restoring shipping flows. A multilateral verification mechanism would be required, which could be provided through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), or similar formats.

(3) A military naval mission that provides assurances to the shipping industry and monitors activities is needed, with the capacity to issue alerts and respond to incidents. Several options are on the table. The coalition led by the UK and France is already in the region but risks provoking resistance. Deploying assets under the EU Aspides operation is the preference of some EU member states, though far from consensual — particularly given France’s deep investment in the other format.

–> Read more in my current briefing slides on the Hormuz Crisis.

2026 SoH observationsDownload


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Our Ocean Conference in Kenya

‘Our Ocean Conference’ is an annual fixture in the global ocean governance calendar. It brings together philanthropists, NGOs, community actors and politicians to strengthen the implementation of the ocean agenda, including the ambitions under the SDG14, 30×30 biodiversity target, and the new BBNJ treaty. The 2026 edition, the 11th conference, is the first time held in Africa, with Mombasa acting as the host city. This brings much-needed attention to the support needs of the African continent.

Although maritime security is one of the priority areas of the conference, there is little sign that the importance of security, safety and blue crime as a major risk factor in ocean governance is taken seriously. After all, any incident — whether piracy or an oil spill — can rapidly undermine conservation efforts and threaten long term blue economy investments. Only three panels of the five day conference deal substantially with blue crimes, with the main focus on illicit fishing and pollution crimes. Other challenges which should feature, such as marine safety, coast guard cooperation, or the role of shipping and ports, do not feature on the agenda.

I had the pleasure to give two presentations. At one of the pre-conference panels, I discussed the importance of better integrating maritime domain awareness with other information sharing systems, including those developed for ocean observation and marine spatial planning. This draws on my ongoing work on Maritime Domain Awareness and a collaboration with Paul Trautendorffer of JPI Oceans. At an informal side event on the Regional Maritime Security Architecture in the Western Indian Ocean, organized by the Indian Ocean Commission, the Kenya Navy, and the University of Oxford, I gave a brief talk on the changing maritime security environment and how research can assist in coping with it.

Delighted to note that the Charles Telfair Centre of Mauritius, which I joined as an associate fellow this year, has a strong presence. Dr. Myriam Blin, the director of the Centre, was invited to chair the main plenary session focused on maritime security, which is scheduled for this Thursday. This is evidence of growing recognition that island leadership is key in maritime security. Yet, more efforts will be needed to build stronger bridges between maritime peace and security and the other ocean agendas.


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Maritime security engagements in Türkiye

Over the last week I had a series of engagements with the maritime security community in Türkiye.

The annual conference of the NATO Maritime Security Center of Excellence in Istanbul is an increasingly important thinking space for developing strategy on maritime security. This year’s focus was on the grey zone and I had the pleasure to act for the second time as the conference’s academic advisor. Key points:

Whether it is sabotage of infrastructure, spoofing and jamming, shadow fleets, or attacks on shipping, the grey zone is increasingly defining the maritime security agenda.

As stressed in my opening and closing remarks at the conference, we need to develop our conceptual vocabulary on the grey zone, think through the ‘black and whites’ categories involved, and tailor responses.

I also gave a presentation at the gathering of the European Tugowners Association in Istanbul. The event reflected on the consequences of maritime security for the industry. Key point:

Tugboat operations are vital for the transport industry, but are mainly invisible. Yet, they might be more crucial for maritime security than often considered.

Last was a conference organized by DEHUKAM in Ankara as part of the run-up to the 2026 NATO summit. We focused on the lessons from the situation in the Black Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Key points:

It’s important that NATO develops a clearer understanding of what roles it plays in addressing maritime security in these contexts.

The need to adapt and develop better strategies in light of the proliferation of low-cost and autonomous weapons and grey zone incidents is paramount.


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Facing new maritime uncertainties: Takeaways from Atalanta’s Industry Strategy Meeting

How are navies and the transport industry coping with ongoing uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz and wider Western Indian Ocean?

Attacks on shipping, the US naval blockade, mines in the Strait of Hormuz, but also the ongoing threat from Houthi forces and the resurgence of piracy combine to create a volatile environment. The negotiations between Iran and the US are ongoing with an uncertain timeline and little prospect for immediate resolution.

Over the last few days, I had the pleasure of participating in the 17th Industry Strategy Meeting (ISM) organized by EU Naval Operation Atalanta in cooperation with Aspides and the Combined Maritime Forces.

The ISM is an established fixture in the annual maritime security calendar, bringing together naval missions operating in the region and representatives of the shipping industry to review threats, risks, and operational effectiveness. Held each spring in Madrid, it forms a pair with the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Meeting (SHADE), which convenes each autumn in the region itself — together providing a rhythm of strategic reflection and operational coordination across the year.

Challenges and Gaps in the current response

Five key insights from the meeting:

(1) The multinational military mission led by France and the UK (which now has the acronym M3 SoH) is being prepared with several naval assets deployed to the region. Planning is now on two levels: a political contact group and military coordination. The current time horizon is 12 months. There is little sign that the shipping industry has been meaningfully consulted, or that questions such as environmental consequences or the long-term legal status and transit regime have been properly addressed.

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