Christian Bueger


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A review of EU maritime security – talk in Dublin

What’s the state of play of EU maritime security policy?

Ireland, which holds the presidency of the European Council until the end of the year, has made maritime security a priority. The country invited me to give a talk last week to reflect on this question and provide a strategic review.

This was a great opportunity to revisit the assessment I did with Tim Edmunds, published three years ago in the Naval War College Review. What has changed?

On one side, not that much. The EU continues to grapple with the strategic challenges we set out in 2023: the plethora of strategic documents — now joined by the 2024 EU Maritime Strategy and the European Ocean Pact — still doesn’t give clear direction or harmonise efforts; interagency coordination remains less developed than it could be; and capacity-building efforts are still fragmented across a growing multitude of projects with 3-5 year lifespans. Most EU operations are running at capacity and facing real constraints, a problem that has become more acute since the launch of Aspides in 2024.

On the other side, the context of maritime security has shifted profoundly with the arrival of the age of grey-zone tactics. Critical maritime infrastructure protection has broadened the agenda and led to a flurry of activity, such as the EU’s subsea cable action plan. Maritime cybersecurity challenges are on the rise. The crises in the Red Sea and, later, the Strait of Hormuz have turned the sea into a far more volatile environment.

Perhaps most problematic in light of these developments: the EU has started to abandon its ambition to be a “global maritime security provider.” Much of current maritime security policy is inward-looking — concerned with European waters rather than the stability of the global maritime domain.

Yet at a time when the United States’ role as guarantor of global maritime security is increasingly questioned, it is vital that the EU sustains its ambitions. One way forward is to breathe new life into emerging partnerships — with the Nordic-Baltic 8++, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Türkiye, and India.

The EU could also show more leadership in multilateral processes: the UN Security Council debate on a global maritime security structure, advancing the law of naval warfare, addressing sea mine proliferation, and related areas.


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Meetings on the Strait of Hormuz crisis

Navigation through the Strait of Hormuz continues to be volatile. While the Memorandum of Understanding signed between Iran and the United States has provided some structure to the discussion, recent attacks indicate that escalation can return at any time. Key open questions concern how to design a future transit regime for the Strait that addresses the needs of all stakeholders without challenging prevalent understandings of the law of the sea. I had the pleasure to discuss these questions at two recent high-level events in Geneva and Brussels.

The second Geneva Maritime Roundtable, which I co-organized with Zoltán Turbék, was again generously hosted by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and brought more than 25 representatives from embassies, the transport industry, NGOs, and UN agencies together. It confirmed Geneva’s role as a hub for maritime governance and diplomacy, home to important stakeholders in the sector.

The other event was a high-level briefing organized by the European Commission’s DG IDEA, focused on how the EU can address the conflict and what to prioritize in its partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Both events surfaced a consistent set of priorities:

(1) The debate on the future of transit through the Strait requires a structured political process — such as a Dialogue or Contact Group — in which the full spectrum of issues can be discussed at both diplomatic and technical levels. This would ideally lead to a sustainable governance mechanism for the Strait, including agreed interpretations of the law of the sea, a dispute settlement mechanism and attention to environmental concerns.

(2) The question of how mine clearance will be conducted and how the area can be declared mine-free is critical for restoring shipping flows. A multilateral verification mechanism would be required, which could be provided through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), or similar formats.

(3) A military naval mission that provides assurances to the shipping industry and monitors activities is needed, with the capacity to issue alerts and respond to incidents. Several options are on the table. The coalition led by the UK and France is already in the region but risks provoking resistance. Deploying assets under the EU Aspides operation is the preference of some EU member states, though far from consensual — particularly given France’s deep investment in the other format.

–> Read more in my current briefing slides on the Hormuz Crisis.

2026 SoH observationsDownload


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Our Ocean Conference in Kenya

‘Our Ocean Conference’ is an annual fixture in the global ocean governance calendar. It brings together philanthropists, NGOs, community actors and politicians to strengthen the implementation of the ocean agenda, including the ambitions under the SDG14, 30×30 biodiversity target, and the new BBNJ treaty. The 2026 edition, the 11th conference, is the first time held in Africa, with Mombasa acting as the host city. This brings much-needed attention to the support needs of the African continent.

Although maritime security is one of the priority areas of the conference, there is little sign that the importance of security, safety and blue crime as a major risk factor in ocean governance is taken seriously. After all, any incident — whether piracy or an oil spill — can rapidly undermine conservation efforts and threaten long term blue economy investments. Only three panels of the five day conference deal substantially with blue crimes, with the main focus on illicit fishing and pollution crimes. Other challenges which should feature, such as marine safety, coast guard cooperation, or the role of shipping and ports, do not feature on the agenda.

I had the pleasure to give two presentations. At one of the pre-conference panels, I discussed the importance of better integrating maritime domain awareness with other information sharing systems, including those developed for ocean observation and marine spatial planning. This draws on my ongoing work on Maritime Domain Awareness and a collaboration with Paul Trautendorffer of JPI Oceans. At an informal side event on the Regional Maritime Security Architecture in the Western Indian Ocean, organized by the Indian Ocean Commission, the Kenya Navy, and the University of Oxford, I gave a brief talk on the changing maritime security environment and how research can assist in coping with it.

Delighted to note that the Charles Telfair Centre of Mauritius, which I joined as an associate fellow this year, has a strong presence. Dr. Myriam Blin, the director of the Centre, was invited to chair the main plenary session focused on maritime security, which is scheduled for this Thursday. This is evidence of growing recognition that island leadership is key in maritime security. Yet, more efforts will be needed to build stronger bridges between maritime peace and security and the other ocean agendas.


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Maritime security engagements in Türkiye

Over the last week I had a series of engagements with the maritime security community in Türkiye.

The annual conference of the NATO Maritime Security Center of Excellence in Istanbul is an increasingly important thinking space for developing strategy on maritime security. This year’s focus was on the grey zone and I had the pleasure to act for the second time as the conference’s academic advisor. Key points:

Whether it is sabotage of infrastructure, spoofing and jamming, shadow fleets, or attacks on shipping, the grey zone is increasingly defining the maritime security agenda.

As stressed in my opening and closing remarks at the conference, we need to develop our conceptual vocabulary on the grey zone, think through the ‘black and whites’ categories involved, and tailor responses.

I also gave a presentation at the gathering of the European Tugowners Association in Istanbul. The event reflected on the consequences of maritime security for the industry. Key point:

Tugboat operations are vital for the transport industry, but are mainly invisible. Yet, they might be more crucial for maritime security than often considered.

Last was a conference organized by DEHUKAM in Ankara as part of the run-up to the 2026 NATO summit. We focused on the lessons from the situation in the Black Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Key points:

It’s important that NATO develops a clearer understanding of what roles it plays in addressing maritime security in these contexts.

The need to adapt and develop better strategies in light of the proliferation of low-cost and autonomous weapons and grey zone incidents is paramount.


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Facing new maritime uncertainties: Takeaways from Atalanta’s Industry Strategy Meeting

How are navies and the transport industry coping with ongoing uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz and wider Western Indian Ocean?

Attacks on shipping, the US naval blockade, mines in the Strait of Hormuz, but also the ongoing threat from Houthi forces and the resurgence of piracy combine to create a volatile environment. The negotiations between Iran and the US are ongoing with an uncertain timeline and little prospect for immediate resolution.

Over the last few days, I had the pleasure of participating in the 17th Industry Strategy Meeting (ISM) organized by EU Naval Operation Atalanta in cooperation with Aspides and the Combined Maritime Forces.

The ISM is an established fixture in the annual maritime security calendar, bringing together naval missions operating in the region and representatives of the shipping industry to review threats, risks, and operational effectiveness. Held each spring in Madrid, it forms a pair with the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Meeting (SHADE), which convenes each autumn in the region itself — together providing a rhythm of strategic reflection and operational coordination across the year.

Challenges and Gaps in the current response

Five key insights from the meeting:

(1) The multinational military mission led by France and the UK (which now has the acronym M3 SoH) is being prepared with several naval assets deployed to the region. Planning is now on two levels: a political contact group and military coordination. The current time horizon is 12 months. There is little sign that the shipping industry has been meaningfully consulted, or that questions such as environmental consequences or the long-term legal status and transit regime have been properly addressed.

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The new situation in the Western Indian Ocean – event in Mauritius

What are the strategic implications of the Strait of Hormuz crisis for small island states?

This week I had the pleasure to discuss this important question at a roundtable in the frame of the WIO Futures conference organized by the Charles Telfair Center.

Small island states have been heavily affected by the shut down of the Strait. Rising energy prices in economies often fully dependent on oil, food prices, gaps in supplies and a drop in tourism are some of the fall outs.

For Islands this means not only to diversify their supply chains, but invest more in local green energy. Delighted to learn that for instance Mauritius has stepped up its programmes.

It also implies that islands need deeper regional integration. Frameworks like the Indian Ocean Commission and the Indian Ocean Rim Association are more valuable today than they have ever been. They offer exactly what isolated small states cannot achieve alone: risk-sharing, collective bargaining, and protection against external shocks.

For maritime security deeper regional integration and more efforts in capacity sharing are likewise needed. This means pooling resources in maritime law enforcement, getting towards working regional information sharing system, and thinking more strategically when and how to rely on the support of maritime powers.


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The Price of Inattention: Somali Piracy Returns – new commentary

Somali piracy is back. In the space of just a few weeks in April and May 2026, at least five vessels have been seized off the Somali coast and nearby waters. The oil tanker Honour 25, loaded with 18,000 barrels of crude and crewed by 17 seafarers from across Asia, was hijacked off Puntland on April 21. The cargo ship Sward was taken days later near Garacad, its fifteen-person crew locked up while nine armed pirates took control. The UAE-flagged dhow Fahad-4 was seized and repurposed as a mother ship — a floating base from which pirates could range across hundreds of miles of open ocean — before being abandoned when supplies ran out. The Togo-flagged tanker Eureka was captured off Yemen and steered toward Somali shores.

The Joint Maritime Information Centre has raised its threat level to “severe.” The conditions for a prolonged crisis are in place.

None of this should surprise us. In a 2024 commentary, I warned that piracy was returning and that the governance structures built to contain it had quietly eroded. The warning signs were already clear in late 2023.

In November, pirates hijacked the Liberian-flagged Central Park off the Yemeni coast, later recaptured by the US Navy. On December 14, the Maltese-flagged MV Ruen was seized and repurposed — exactly as today’s pirates are doing — as a mother ship. In early January 2024, the MV Lila Norfolk was captured before the Indian Navy moved swiftly to retake it. The decisive response came in March 2024, when Indian special forces intercepted the Ruen, arrested 35 pirates, and freed the crew.

The threat appeared to recede. But the underlying conditions were never addressed. Pirates watched, waited, and reorganised.

Five factors explaining the return

What has changed between then and now? Five factors, layered on top of each other, have created the opening that pirate networks in Puntland are exploiting.

The first factor is the de-facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Somali piracy networks are not single-purpose criminal enterprises; they operate across multiple illicit economies, including smuggling through the strait. Denied that revenue stream, criminal financiers are redirecting toward hijacking and ransom.

Second, the broader economic fallout from the US-Israel war on Iran has simultaneously pushed up fuel and food prices across the Horn of Africa, straining coastal communities in Puntland that have historically supplied both recruits and logistical support. When people have no income and no prospects, maritime crime becomes an employer of last resort.

Third, US cuts to development assistance and reductions in UN programme funding have eliminated what limited economic alternatives existed. Counter-piracy experts have long argued that sustainable suppression requires onshore investment — in livelihoods, governance, local institutions. Strip that away, and deterrents at sea become harder to sustain.

The fourth is US disengagement. Washington has reduced its naval contribution to counter-piracy and, more damagingly, has likely scaled back the support that gave the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and its counter-piracy task force its genuine operational bite. On paper, CMF remains a 47-nation partnership. In practice, its effectiveness has always depended on American backbone — and that backbone is being quietly pulled.

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Contested Waters: Maritime Order Under Pressure – Event in Bonn

The maritime domain is facing increasing uncertainty. There is a need to look at the larger strategic picture of how maritime order is changing.

Yesterday, we discussed the Arctic and the Strait of Hormuz as two vital and strategic maritime regions at a public event organized by the Academy of International Affairs NRW in Bonn.

Key takeaways:

The maritime domain is increasingly becoming a contested and ever more politicized space. Contestation over Greenland, the Panama Canal, but also the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are indicators.

Grey-zone and hybrid threats are prevailing and challenge interpretations of the rules and laws of the sea.

Geopolitical fragmentation and new uncertainty provides opportunities for maritime crime syndicates, as seen in the recent resurgence of Somali piracy.

The Strait of Hormuz exemplifies how the proliferation of low-cost weapon systems challenges conventional understandings of naval dominance and control of waterways.

It is vital to look beyond the immediate and maintain a strategic outlook on how multilateral mechanisms can strengthen maritime order in the light of these challenges.

Given the gridlock at the global level, regional and minilateral initiatives will be key to ensuring maritime security.


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Europe-led Strait of Hormuz mission: Why we need more than military planning

Few waterways matter more to the global economy than the Strait of Hormuz—and few are as vulnerable to disruption. Getting shipping flowing again through the Strait of Hormuz is a top priority.

On Friday, the 17th of April, the UK and France convened a head-of-state meeting to discuss a multinational coalition aimed at restoring shipping through the Strait. The level of representation alone signals how seriously the situation is being taken.

Planning is underway, and the coalition is taking shape. Intense discussions over the past week have taken place in four working groups focusing on military coordination, sanctions, humanitarian efforts, and cooperation with the shipping industry. Yet planners should adopt a more comprehensive, long-term outlook.

Why is military protection needed once hostilities end?

Political leaders have stressed that the coalition will only act once a more stable agreement between Iran and the United States is in place and hostilities have ended. Yet even in such a scenario, the shipping industry will still require reassurance from a sustained naval presence.

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