Europe-led Strait of Hormuz mission: Why we need more than military planning
Few waterways matter more to the global economy than the Strait of Hormuz—and few are as vulnerable to disruption. Getting shipping flowing again through the Strait of Hormuz is a top priority.
On Friday, the 17th of April, the UK and France convened a head-of-state meeting to discuss a multinational coalition aimed at restoring shipping through the Strait. The level of representation alone signals how seriously the situation is being taken.
Planning is underway, and the coalition is taking shape. Intense discussions over the past week have taken place in four working groups focusing on military coordination, sanctions, humanitarian efforts, and cooperation with the shipping industry. Yet planners should adopt a more comprehensive, long-term outlook.
Why is military protection needed once hostilities end?
Political leaders have stressed that the coalition will only act once a more stable agreement between Iran and the United States is in place and hostilities have ended. Yet even in such a scenario, the shipping industry will still require reassurance from a sustained naval presence.
Sea mines laid in the strait will need to be cleared, and navies will aim to deter future acts of provocation, including potential attacks on shipping, or in the cyber domain. Without risk reduction, shipping will not return.
Until the coalition can start, the UN’s Fertilizer initiative is the most promising route to bring back a limited amount of shipping and build confidence. However, this humanitarian effort requires that all belligerents agree, which remains unlikely. Significant diplomat pressure by regional states and the international community would be needed.
Is a UN mandate required?
For many nations, such as Germany or Japan, military engagement requires a UN Security Council mandate. Efforts in the Council to agree on a dedicated resolution for the Strait of Hormuz have so far failed, with China and Russia vetoing a draft due to concerns over further escalation.
However, UN Security Council Resolution 2817 provides some limited backing for current efforts. It notes “the right of Member States, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks and provocations, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms.”
A more explicit UN call on states to engage would assist efforts, and the Council should be urged to resume negotiations. An alternative pathway is a UN General Assembly resolution.
Who should be involved in the planning?
The broader the coalition, the higher its legitimacy. Significant resources will be required, and many navies are already overstretched due to regional tensions in Europe and Asia. It is also important that all UN agencies with relevant mandates participate, alongside shipping associations.
In addition to the current set-up, greater attention should be given to environmental consequences—such as oil spills caused by the war—and legal questions, including interpretations of the crucial concepts of ‘innocent’ and ‘transit’ passage. Dedicated working groups should be established for these areas.
Turning the current planning processes more explicitly into an international contact group, as proposed by the German chancellor, would provide a clearer framework and allow other actors to contribute and create a diplomatic forum.
What about the United States and Iran?
Several participating nations, such as the UK, coordinate closely with Washington, yet the U.S. remains outside the current coalition. This is sensible, as including belligerent states at this stage would undermine the impartiality needed for implementation. Given its military capabilities, the U.S. is nevertheless likely to become involved at a later stage.
To establish a cooperative mechanism capable of overcoming current and future gridlock in the Strait, close communication with Iranian leadership will be necessary. However, it is unlikely that Iran will be directly involved.
What is the timescale for the coalition?
The current debate suggests a timeframe of several months for maintaining a naval presence once a stable agreement is in place. This appears unrealistic for three reasons.
First, past experience with naval coalitions shows that they tend to last longer than originally intended.
Second, even after the formal end of hostilities, provocative maritime actions are likely to continue. These may occur in the “grey zone,” where incidents are difficult to attribute. Even before the war began, drone attacks on ships occurred and vessels were seized on questionable legal grounds. Any incident would immediately drive up risk levels.
Third, while an established regional platform such as the Combined Maritime Forces could potentially take over from the new coalition, this presents challenges. This 42-nation partnership has provided maritime security in the region for decades. However, it is led by the United States and is therefore unlikely to offer the level of impartiality required to be acceptable to Iran.
What are the future prospects for freedom of navigation in the Strait?
While any projection remains speculative, the coalition’s naval presence is likely to remain in place for at least two to five years. While costly, this creates an opportunity to negotiate a long-term solution that reduces legal uncertainty and strengthens maritime safety.
A dedicated legal treaty for the Strait of Hormuz is a viable option. Such a treaty could regulate safety and navigation while clarifying the Strait’s legal status and reducing the risk of future disputes.
Historical agreements regulating straits, such as the Copenhagen Convention and the Montreux Convention could serve as templates. Another option is to draw lessons from another strategic waterway, and rely on the procedures of the Cooperative Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and Singapore established under UNCLOS.
The real test is not whether shipping can return, but whether the international community can build a framework that keeps the Strait open in the long term.
Mines & Strait of Hormuz: Meetings in Geneva
What are the larger strategic consequences of the Strait of Hormuz crisis? During my visit to Geneva last Friday, I had the opportunity to discuss this question at two events.
I gave a presentation on the Strait at a maritime roundtable organized by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. I highlighted that we are facing long-term instability, not only in the Gulf region but also across the maritime domain more broadly. Grey-zone warfare, lawfare, and attempts to exert political control over key waterways are becoming increasingly common patterns.
It is important to start thinking about long-term political solutions for the Strait of Hormuz, including a formal, legally binding transit regime. The discussion also underscored that international law relevant to this situation remains underdeveloped, particularly with regard to straits and naval warfare. Also, questions of environmental security and the situation of seafarers currently do not receive sufficient attention.
I also presented new research on naval mines at a side event on underwater explosives at the 29th International Meeting of Mine Action National Directors and United Nations Advisers (NDM-UN29), organized by JPI Oceans. Key points:
- Naval mines are increasingly used in armed conflicts that includes the Red Sea, the Black Sea and the Strait of Hormuz;
- More and more states are reinvesting in sea mines;
- There is a significant normative deficit regarding the use and clearance of modern naval mines—the law is outdated.
New Commentary: Strengthening the UN’s role in maritime security
The UN Security Council will continue its strategic debate on maritime security next week. Bahrain is chairing an open debate on the topic. Much of the discussion is likely to be overshadowed by the tricky situation in the Strait of Hormuz.
However, there are broader issues at stake: How can the UN engage with maritime security and peace in a more sustained and strategic manner? In a new contribution for UNIDIR’s maritime security workstream I show that the UN faces gaps in coordination and analysis.
I propose reform steps, which are modest in ambition, but significant in impact. The UN’s approach would be stronger through:
- a thematic Security Council resolution,
- a Secretary General report,
- deeper in-house expertise,
- and mainstreaming the maritime security agenda.
Read the full text here.
Keynote at One Ocean Summit in Bergen
One Ocean Week in Bergen, Norway, was a great gathering of ocean entrepreneurs, industry leaders, and policymakers. I had the pleasure of presenting the opening keynote at the One Ocean Summit and participating in two panels. Here are my key takeaways:
- While the oceans have received unprecedented political attention, discussions on peace and security, ocean health, and the blue economy remain disconnected.
- We should move beyond current discussions of dual use and instead develop multi-use systems—ones that support security while also benefiting the economy, conservation, science, and people.
- To improve maritime security governance, global (UN), regional seas, and national responses need to be better coordinated.
- The everyday, often quiet work of coastguards is essential to strengthening ocean governance. More efforts are needed to build coastguard capacity and enhance cooperation in Europe and beyond.
The recording of the opening session is available here.
The promise and perils of regional maritime security governance in the Western Indian Ocean
Global maritime security depends on effective regional institutions. In the Western Indian Ocean, a major building block is the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) — a platform connecting 21 countries from the Eastern African shore, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf.
What’s the state of play of this grouping of states? Over the last few days, I participated in a seminar in Mombasa, Kenya, organized by the U.S. Africa Center for Strategic Studies to find out.
How does DCoC operate?
The DCoC continues to serve as a platform for maritime law enforcement professionals and maritime authorities, facilitated by the International Maritime Organization — the United Nations’ shipping regulator. Created in 2009 to contribute to the fight against piracy, its mandate was later expanded to cover maritime crime more broadly. Over the years, the platform has matured institutionally, developing a steering committee and three working groups.
In essence, the DCoC has two main purposes:
- To set standards for how member states organize their maritime security governance and to enable coordination among them,
- To coordinate the delivery of capacity building.
The organization has clearly progressed in developing standards, yet national implementation remains limited. Capacity-building coordination is important but highly intricate, given divergent donor interests and political considerations.
What are the challenges?
The DCoC continues to pursue ambitious plans, yet regional meetings alone will not be enough to realize them. National politics, resource constraints, funding limitations, and diverging priorities remain difficult hurdles to overcome.
Another persistent challenge is how the DCoC interacts with other regional platforms. The interfaces between the DCoC and the Regional Maritime Security Architecture — a well-functioning, smaller cooperation framework between seven Eastern African states led by the Indian Ocean Commission and funded by the European Union — are becoming increasingly well organized.
However, linkages to other regional maritime security entities, ranging from the Gulf Cooperation Council and India’s regional information-sharing center to the Nairobi Convention, the Combined Maritime Forces or the Indian Ocean Rim Association remain ambiguous and underdeveloped.
Will geopolitical fragmentation impact the partnership?
While not yet immediately visible at the meeting I attended, the DCoC will not escape broader geopolitical fragmentation. This includes relations among member states and their neighbors, dynamics involving India and Pakistan, South Africa’s geopolitical positioning, and the evolving role of the United States in the region — not least in light of the recent Gulf War.
Stewardship by a United Nations agency will remain important to move this platform forward. At the same time, it raises the question of whether the region might benefit from smaller, more functional cooperation frameworks — potentially decoupling Red Sea and Gulf security from the distinct challenges and needs of African coastal states.
Another pathway would be to continue the process of institutional maturation and begin treating DCoC agreements as a form of regional customary law. Whether national legislatures are ready to move in that direction remains uncertain.
What’s the future of the maritime security architecture in WIO? Let’s discuss on LinkedIn
A Contact Group for the Strait of Hormuz?
The question of how to restore safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most pressing issues for the global economy.
Much of the debate has focused on the control system Iran intends to establish and the role the United States may play, with the U.S. President indicating a willingness to collaborate. Whatever the outcome, uncertainty is likely to remain high, suggesting that these arrangements alone may not be sufficient to alter the risk assessments of the shipping industry.
This underscores the continued importance of exploring whether and how multilateral arrangements can contribute. More than 30 states have expressed their willingness to support a multilateral solution and have begun coordinating their positions.
The UN Security Council, which could provide both mandate and legitimacy for such an endeavor, has so far been unable to reach agreement. A draft resolution by Bahrain calling for close coordination among affected states was put to a vote on the 7th of April, but China and Russia exercised their vetoes, citing concerns that the proposed authorizations could be misinterpreted and risk further escalation. Discussions in the Council are expected to continue.
A more practical question therefore arises: if a coalition of over 30 states seeks to act, what form could this take? A central element would be an international coordination mechanism. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has proposed the establishment of an international contact group.
Contact groups are proven crisis management instruments
Contact groups are a proven instrument in international crisis management and have demonstrated their value in maritime contexts. Notably, much of the success in countering piracy off the coast of Somalia between 2008 and 2012 can be attributed to the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).
Their utility lies in enabling strategic alignment, operational coordination, the development of legal pathways, and the preparation of decisions within formal international organizations. They help depoliticize cooperation by focusing on concrete, manageable issues, thereby limiting the impact of broader geopolitical tensions.
They are also agile and impose a relatively low administrative burden. Their flexible participation formats allow for engagement with industry and civil society ensuring that relevant expertise is incorporated.
How the group could work in practice
A Contact Group for the Strait of Hormuz could be mandated to serve several purposes:
- To provide reassurance to the shipping industry and help stabilize risk assessments;
- to deter hostile actions and provocations against shipping, including in the cyber and subsea domains;
- to ensure the Strait remains free of mine-related risks;
- to coordinate and deconflict naval operations among participating states
- to address divergences in the interpretation of the law of the sea
- to support long-term safety arrangements, including consideration of a dedicated treaty
- to identify solutions for recovering the maritime ecosystems from war-related pollution
Broad but functional participation will be essential. This could include:
- States with a high interest in freedom of navigation in the Strait, and states that currently operate naval forces in the region, including through multi-national naval forces (e.g. EUNVAFOR Operation Atalanta, or Combined Maritime Forces);
- international shipping industry associations, including International Chamber of Shipping, BIMCO, INTERTANKO, and INTERCARGO;
- international organizations with a relevant mandate, including the International Maritime Organization (IMO), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UN Environment Programme, UN Institute for Disarmament Research, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), World Food Programme (WFP);
- regional organizations active in maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, European Union, Djibouti Code of Conduct, and Indian Ocean Commission
- selected non-governmental organizations, including seafarer organizations, as appropriate.
Drawing on the CGPCS model, the group could be structured around a plenary and several technical working groups. A plenary with a rotating chair, meeting quarterly, could provide strategic direction and issue communiqués to enhance transparency. Possible technical working groups could focus on operational naval coordination and deconfliction (WG1), information sharing, industry engagement and communication (WG2), legal harmonization, bringing together law of the sea experts from foreign ministries (WG3), and environmental challenges arising from the war (WG4).
Given that the United Kingdom has already convened a group of states, it could take the lead in establishing the contact group and proposing initial terms of reference, drawing on the CGPCS experience. While a Security Council mandate would be desirable, there is no need to wait for one—though efforts to secure such a mandate should continue.
A moment of relief: What’s next for the Strait of Hormuz?
The decision by the United States not to further escalate its conflict with Iran, alongside a two-week ceasefire, has offered the global economy a brief moment of relief. Both sides have declared victory. Yet as details of the agreement slowly emerge—and remain subject to further negotiation—it is clear that the outlook for global trade is mixed.
A temporary arrangement has been reached for the Strait of Hormuz, one of the central arteries of the global economy. This narrow waterway is critical not only for energy flows but also for the food security of billions. What happens here reverberates far beyond the region.
Since the onset of hostilities involving the United States and Israel, Iran has exercised tight control over navigation through the strait. It has threatened to target vessels linked to its adversaries while guaranteeing safe passage to only a limited number of ships, primarily those transporting Iranian oil to Asia. In practice, the strait has been neither fully closed nor fully open.
The ceasefire appears to ease immediate tensions. Iran is expected to lift its direct threats against commercial shipping. However, it will retain significant control over access. Rather than restoring full freedom of navigation, the emerging “new normal” places decisions over passage largely at Iran’s discretion.
Tehran has also indicated its intention to impose transit fees as a means of compensation for the war. While international law does not permit direct charges for passage, it does allow fees for services rendered (see UNCLOS para. 26). This legal grey area could provide Iran with substantial leverage. Much will depend on the details—particularly the criteria used to determine which vessels are allowed to transit and under what conditions. For now, those rules remain opaque.
A process at the International Maritime Organization will likely be required to puzzle out the details and offer the industry reassurance. How this impacts the risk assessments of the shipping industry remains to be seen. Many shippers are likely to pause their transits and wait to see how the situation develops.
Higher transit costs, increased insurance premiums, and persistent uncertainty will likely raise the price of shipping. Countries heavily dependent on this route will bear the burden, effectively absorbing part of the economic cost of the conflict and essentially paying for Trump’s war.
Diplomatically, the ceasefire marks a success for regional actors, notably Pakistan, which acted as the facilitator, backed by its partners Egypt, Turkiye and Saud Arabia – increasingly known as the Muslim Quad. We are likely to hear more from this new grouping and its strategy not only in the Gulf but also in the broader Indian Ocean.
At the same time, we are facing a moment that underscores the weakening of the multilateral system. The UN Security Council met only hours before the ceasefire was agreed to vote on a resolution that would have implied a broader global agreement for the Strait of Hormuz.
It would have provided the foundation for a multilateral mechanism, such as a contact group, that could provide safety in the Strait in the long run. China and Russia used their veto. The failure to adopt a broader agreement highlights growing geopolitical fragmentation. Yet, a Security Council resolution is not fully off the table. After this failure, restarting negotiations will require some time.
The result is not a return to normality, but the emergence of a more politicized and fragile maritime environment—one in which chokepoints are increasingly weaponized and politically controlled. Freedom of navigation will become more and more limited.
Upcoming UN Security Council resolution on Strait of Hormuz
The first UN Security Council resolution (2817) on the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz was historic: 135 states sponsored the document calling for an end to attacks on shipping. Ten days of intense negotiations later, the Council is expected to vote on a follow-up resolution today.
According to the Security Council Report, the resolution calls on states “to coordinate efforts, defensive in nature, commensurate to the circumstances, to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels, and to deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation”.
That means that the Council will not explicitly authorize the use of force, as some states called for. Its focus on defensive measures is useful, as it does not risk escalation.
The resolution will serve as a solid foundation for a future arrangement for governing the strait, which can be put in place once a ceasefire is agreed. This will be led by the 40-nation-plus coalition of states that have already agreed to contribute to the protection of shipping in the region.
A contact group will likely be the best format to organize the coalition, to enhance military coordination, coordination with the shipping industry, and to harmonize legal understandings.
As I have argued in a recent commentary for EUobserver, the EU could play a leading role, given its experience with organizing multilateral naval operations, and the strong information-sharing infrastructure it has in place.
All of this only can be activated once hostilities end. It’s important to have solid planning already now.
Media roundup – situation in Strait of Hormuz
Transit through one of the global economy’s most central water way – the Strait of Hormuz – continues to be limited. Since the war started on 28th of February, only few ships have gone through the Strait. These were either directly linked to Iran, or countries negotiated individual passages with the government. The economic impact has been globally felt and the crisis effects small island states and least developed countries in the most dramatic way.
Over the past days, I have spoken to different media to help publics to understand better why it is difficult to return to normal traffic in the Strait. The strait cannot just be opened but require a multi-stage process. Diplomatic solutions are key to develop a governance arrangement that can provide some level of physical protection for shipping and reassurance. A UN mandate would be crucial to ensure impartiality and legitimacy. Highlights include conversations with Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Wall Street Journal, and France24. See the full overview here.