Christian Bueger


The promise and perils of regional maritime security governance in the Western Indian Ocean

Global maritime security depends on effective regional institutions. In the Western Indian Ocean, a major building block is the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) — a platform connecting 21 countries from the Eastern African shore, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf.

What’s the state of play of this grouping of states? Over the last few days, I participated in a seminar in Mombasa, Kenya, organized by the U.S. Africa Center for Strategic Studies to find out.

How does DCoC operate?

The DCoC continues to serve as a platform for maritime law enforcement professionals and maritime authorities, facilitated by the International Maritime Organization — the United Nations’ shipping regulator. Created in 2009 to contribute to the fight against piracy, its mandate was later expanded to cover maritime crime more broadly. Over the years, the platform has matured institutionally, developing a steering committee and three working groups.

In essence, the DCoC has two main purposes:

  • To set standards for how member states organize their maritime security governance and to enable coordination among them,
  • To coordinate the delivery of capacity building.

The organization has clearly progressed in developing standards, yet national implementation remains limited. Capacity-building coordination is important but highly intricate, given divergent donor interests and political considerations.

What are the challenges?

The DCoC continues to pursue ambitious plans, yet regional meetings alone will not be enough to realize them. National politics, resource constraints, funding limitations, and diverging priorities remain difficult hurdles to overcome.

Another persistent challenge is how the DCoC interacts with other regional platforms. The interfaces between the DCoC and the Regional Maritime Security Architecture — a well-functioning, smaller cooperation framework between seven Eastern African states led by the Indian Ocean Commission and funded by the European Union — are becoming increasingly well organized.

However, linkages to other regional maritime security entities, ranging from the Gulf Cooperation Council and India’s regional information-sharing center to the Nairobi Convention, the Combined Maritime Forces or the Indian Ocean Rim Association remain ambiguous and underdeveloped.

Will geopolitical fragmentation impact the partnership?

While not yet immediately visible at the meeting I attended, the DCoC will not escape broader geopolitical fragmentation. This includes relations among member states and their neighbors, dynamics involving India and Pakistan, South Africa’s geopolitical positioning, and the evolving role of the United States in the region — not least in light of the recent Gulf War.

Stewardship by a United Nations agency will remain important to move this platform forward. At the same time, it raises the question of whether the region might benefit from smaller, more functional cooperation frameworks — potentially decoupling Red Sea and Gulf security from the distinct challenges and needs of African coastal states.

Another pathway would be to continue the process of institutional maturation and begin treating DCoC agreements as a form of regional customary law. Whether national legislatures are ready to move in that direction remains uncertain.

What’s the future of the maritime security architecture in WIO? Let’s discuss on LinkedIn


Maritime security futures for the UN – Discussions in New York

 Back from maritime security discussions in New York. Some key observations:

The situation in the Persian Gulf is unsurprisingly dominating the agenda at the UN. The historic consensus around Security Council Resolution 2817, co-sponsored by no less than 136 countries, documents that the UN and the Security Council have to play a major role in resolving the war.

Bringing shipping back to the Strait of Hormuz is a top priority, but will be tricky. The Secretary-General’s new initiative to establish a humanitarian mechanism for shipping fertilizer is a beacon of hope. It could be a starting point for restoring trust and confidence and provide the seeds for a more sustainable arrangement.

Planning for post-conflict scenarios for the Strait of Hormuz is under way. Several scenarios are discussed at high levels. The first UN maritime peace operation is one option on the table. All of this can only start once a ceasefire is in place.

Importantly, the current crisis feeds the momentum that the UN system requires a more sustained and strategic approach to maritime security. The strong consensus to act became visible during the two high-level debates last year. Delighted to learn that Bahrain will drive the debate forward during its April presidency.

I had the pleasure of briefing the UN Task Force on Security Sector Reform on how UN-level maritime security work can be better coordinated. For the task force, the sea is one of its eight priorities. Small steps so far, but very important and promising. I hope we will see more from the taskforce.

Thanks to the delegations that took time out from their busy schedules to meet me. Special thanks to Thomas Tödtling and Christophe Pradier for their leadership in pushing forward the agenda.

Looking forward to visiting the city again soon to feed in ideas for this important debate.


Maritime security in Southeast Asia: Celebrating the 20th anniversary of ReCAAP

Southeast Asia has long been a region of maritime security innovation. A key driver was the maritime piracy crisis in the late 2000s.

A key regional governance mechanism originating from that time is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and its associated Information Sharing Centre (ISC). ReCAAP is one of the few legally binding and well institutionalized regional maritime security frameworks that has served as a role model for arrangements such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct in the Western Indian Ocean and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in the Gulf of Guinea.

On Friday, 13.3., I had the pleasure to participate in the symposium celebrating the 20th anniversary of ReCAAP as a panel moderator. This provided a great opportunity to revisit a comprehensive study on maritime domain awareness in Southeast Asia that I conducted in 2015. Most of the observations continue to be valid:

ReCAAP’s main function is to provide a clearing house for piracy-related information and to analyze available incident data. It’s key strength is to ensure high level of awareness and understanding of piracy in the region, even if threat levels are low. The centre’s work is moreover important in capacity building and the exchange of lessons across global ocean regions.


The EU’s 2026 Ocean Days: Ocean Observation meets Maritime Domain Awareness

Held annually in the first week of March the EU Ocean Days are the EU’s spectacle showcasing its work related to the sea. It is, moreover, an opportunity for the EU institutions to engage in stakeholder dialogues.

My visit to the 2026 edition confirmed: the attention to the oceans by the various EU institutions is impressive. Yet, the focus is multi-directional. As we have discussed in a recent book chapter, the flurry of initiatives risks fragmentation. Indeed, the thicket of programs, policies, and strategies is nearly impossible to navigate. It is hard to imagine that anyone has a complete picture.

Particularly encouraging was the emphasis on data collection, sharing, and fusion for ocean health, the blue economy, and maritime security. The announcement of significant funding for the OceanEye initiative was a clear highlight. For the first time the event also featured sessions on maritime security, led by by the dedicated team in DG Mare.

As part of the week, I organized a side event together with Paul Trautendorfer of JPI Oceans. Continuing my work on information sharing, at this stakeholder dialogue event we investigated how the EU’s approach to ocean observation and maritime domain awareness can be better harmonized and streamlined. Our background paper showed that more than 15 platforms are currently funded by the EU.

The discussion highlighted the need for stronger efforts in

  • ocean data meta-governance,
  • greater awareness of the different platforms and their strengths and weaknesses, and
  • better bridges between the scientific, conservation, safety, and defense communities.


Strategic Foresight Diplomacy in Action – The EU-Indonesia dialogue.

It was a pleasure to contribute to an innovative EU-Indonesia track 1.5 dialogue this week.

Track 1.5 dialogues are a conventional tool in diplomacy. In Southeast Asia they are even one of the main modes of diplomatic negotiations – known as the ‘ASEAN way’. Mixing participants from ministries of foreign affairs, governmental research organizations and independent think tanks, their primarily objective is usually trust and confidence building, developing interpersonal networks, but also epistemic alignments: open exchanges on problem interpretation, current and planned policies, recent developments and plans. Chatham house rules are usually applied and participants are asked to make frank remarks or ask critical questions, which could otherwise violate diplomatic conventions. If and how such events are effective and trickle down to formal track 1.0 diplomatic negotiations is often debated, but in the end very difficult to measure.

This week I participated in the EU-Indonesia track 1.5 dialogue. Mainly concerned about the implications of the recent comprehensive trade treaty, the event was noteworthy as the EU tried out a new format: strategic foresight. In what might be described as “foresight diplomacy”, the focus of the event was on exchanges on foresight expertise.


Strategic foresight is a planning approach that has become increasingly popular in the defense sector, economic policy making, but also the commercial sector. As a methodology it is focused on the management of risk by identifying mega trends and scenarios. Contrary to forecasting, multiple futures are anticipated and evaluated for their plausibility in participative processes. The goal of planning is preparedness and resilience. Both the OECD and NATO have developed important guidelines for carrying out such analyses and the EU and Indonesia, but also many others, have developed foresight capacities in their diplomatic services.

Foresight diplomacy is focused on the systematic exchange not only of experience, but also the outcomes of foresight exercises. Comparisons between meta trends, scenarios and resulting gaps and planning priorities serve as the basis for not only epistemic alignment, but also identifying common interests and collective action space.

According to the organizers the event that I attended was one of the first in which the EU, led by the foresight unit in the European External Action Service and its partner – Forward Global –, tested this approach. While there’s a risk that foresight diplomacy dialogues become methods driven and technocratic, they might be extremely useful to overcome the short-termism and news focus that too often prevails at track 1.5 dialogues. I look forward to following how the EU continues to advance this innovative form of diplomacy.


Discussing UN’s role in maritime security in New York

Back in New York for a discussion on the UN’s role in global maritime security.

In 2025, the UN Security Council has held two general high level meetings on maritime security as well as an Arria formula meeting on seafarers. Additionally, dozens of smaller informal meetings were held in New York. The current momentum and the strong consensus of nations to improve maritime security responses, expressed at these events, is unprecedented. It reflects the rapidly evolving maritime challenges, including armed attacks on shipping, substandard shipping to evade sanctions, persistent piracy and smuggling.

At an event co-organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) New York Office and Greece, we discussed what the UN could do better and more effectively. In my intervention, I laid out the challenges:

  • The oceanic disconnect: Discussions on blue economy and marine conservation, e.g. within the framework of the UN Ocean Conference, are largely disconnected from maritime security debate.
  • Too many agencies, too little coordination. As identified in our 2024 UNIDIR report, a high number of UN agencies address maritime security through different mandates, with no coordination processes between them.
  • Capacity building traps. We lack solid understanding of who is training whom in what, and what types of capacity building are lacking.
  • Data gaps: We are far from a comprehensive global picture of maritime security incidents, trends and patterns. While maritime domain awareness centers provide this on a regional level, no one ensures global data.
  • Analytical void: There is too little analytical expertise within the UN to ensure that we make sense of patterns and trends, act preventively, and identify the norm deficits of emerging issues.

Following up on my intervention in the Council in May this year, I called for an office dedicated to maritime security. This would act as a clearing house and develop an annual report on the state of maritime security for the Council and General Assembly to consider. It could ensure sustainability, reduce waste of resources, and enhance efficiency.

Other speakers highlighted the need to mainstream maritime security across UN activities, including, e.g. in peace operations, stressed the importance of inter-regional cooperation, and flagged the need for preventive action. Newly emerging challenges were also discussed, including nuclear-powered ships and floating sea mines.

In 2026, countries with strong maritime interest, including Bahrain, Colombia and Liberia, will join the Council. This is likely to generate further momentum for maritime security. Whether the P5—notably Russia and China—will agree to a Council resolution that paves the way to a more structured and sustainable approach remains to be seen.


Visit to Indian maritime security center

Continuing my tour of the world’s leading maritime domain awareness centers, I had the pleasure of visiting the Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) last week. The center is an initiative by the Indian Navy to improve information sharing and understanding of maritime security dynamics.

IFC-IOR is modeled after the Singapore Navy’s Information Fusion Center. It is staffed by Indian Navy personnel as well as International Liaison Officers from the Indian Ocean region from currently 15 countries. Closely linked to India’s national maritime fusion center (IMAC), the IFC-IOR’s backbone is an information fusion platform named ‘Mantra’.

Overall, the center performs four main functions:

  • It provides reports on maritime security incidents at regular intervals to provide accurate information on patterns of maritime security threats with a focus on the Indian Ocean region as well as the Gulf of Guinea.
  • The center provides support to regional maritime operations by the Indian Navy, including incidents of piracy or search and rescue missions.
  • It engages in regional capacity building activities and training through workshops on maritime domain awareness and information sharing.
  • Confidence building and naval diplomacy through building relations with international and regional maritime security forces is another major task.

In acting as a regional maritime information clearinghouse, high-level reporting is currently the IFC-IOR’s strongest contribution to the regional maritime security architecture.

Like other centers and platforms, the IFC-IOR faces the challenges of how to better integrate with other initiatives, including the four centers that form SHADE’s Single Information Framework. Another challenge lies in how to automate work, and move from information sharing to enhancing operations through prediction.

In regional terms, the center will also need to strengthen its role in supporting coordinated regional maritime security operations, including those led by its neighbors or organized in the framework of the Regional Maritime Security Architecture.


Coast guard gathering in Rome

What challenges are the cost guards of the world facing? This week I had the pleasure to participate in the largest global gathering of coast guards in Rome to find out.

As I discussed in my recent edition of ‘Turbulent Seas’, coast guards are becoming more and more important in maritime security.

The Rome gathering, organized by the Italian Coast Guard, comprised of back-to back meetings of the Mediterranean, European and Global Coast Guard forums, brought more than 100 delegations to the city. The gathering, which included in person remarks by Giorgia Meloni and the Secretary General of the International Maritime Organization, was a useful indicator for the key issues currently on the agenda:

  • Artificial Intelligence and Technology Integration: There was a strong emphasis across all three events on leveraging AI, unmanned systems, big data analytics, and emerging technologies to enhance maritime domain awareness, search and rescue operations, and predictive security capabilities.
  • International Cooperation and Information Sharing: Discussions prioritized collaborative approaches to maritime challenges, featuring extensive partnerships between coast guards, EU agencies (EMSA, EFCA, FRONTEX), and international organizations for shared training, capacity building, and data exchange.
  • Climate and Environmental Focus: Significant attention was given to ocean health, climate change impacts, decarbonization of shipping, alternative fuel sources, and environmental enforcement, reflecting the maritime sector’s adaptation to sustainability challenges.

Ensuring that coast guards exchange lessons and promising practices in dealing with these challenges is vital. I look forward to continue observing how international coast guard cooperation unfolds and hopefully some of our upcoming research can be useful. India will host the next Global Coast Guard Summit in 2027.


Discussing maritime security in Maldives

Small island states are at the frontier of maritime security and ocean conservation—a reality I experienced firsthand during my recent visit to the Maldives.

Consisting of more than 1,200 tiny islands, the country relies on inland waterways as its main transport routes, while resort tourism drives the economy. Tuna is the staple food and features in almost all local dishes.

In meetings with the Coast Guard and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I learned about the challenges of managing and safeguarding the maritime economy. While the coast guard is capable and well-equipped, the vast threat landscape makes stronger regional cooperation urgent.

The primary purpose of my visit was to participate in the Theveli Conference, the annual flagship event of the The Maldives National University (MNU). This amazing interdisciplinary gathering brings together researchers interested in the nature, society, and politics of the Maldives and other small island states.

In my keynote address, I discussed how academics can contribute to global ocean politics and how we can improve at translating research into policy, drawing on my experience in maritime security and, most recently, in the UN Security Council. Link to video.

I also taught a short course on linking blue economy to maritime security which led to interesting exchanges on what priorities Maldives should aim for.

Moreover, I participated in a roundtable marking the launch of ‘Small States Maritime Security’ by Athaulla (‘Atho’) Rasheed. The book offers an excellent analysis of maritime challenges facing small states—highly recommended reading.

Delighted to learn that the university is launching two degree programmes on ‘ocean governance’ and on ‘small island state security’ which will be unique educational opportunities in the region.

I look forward to returning to explore more of the islands and their remarkable marine life. Unfortunately, my schedule was too busy, and there wasn’t any time for snorkeling.


Visit to Taipei, talk at Ketagalan Forum

Critical maritime infrastructure protection is a global concern, as nations worldwide face the challenge of ensuring the resilience of subsea cables and offshore infrastructure. This week, I visited Taipei to discuss how subsea data cables and offshore green energy installations can be better protected in the island’s waters. I participated in the Ketagalan Forum and met with local security experts and policy makers.

Over recent years, the island has faced a series of accidents that led to cuts in vital data cables. This has made protection a top policy priority, raising questions about how lessons from the Baltic Sea can be adapted to Taiwan.

Yet, the concern should not be with data cables alone. Like the Baltic Sea region, the waters off Taiwan have enormous wind energy potential that could, in essence, fully decarbonize the industry. However, expanding offshore wind will require attention to security concerns.

To enhance resilience, Taiwan will need to draw on international best practices: improve its connectivity, enhance surveillance of its maritime domain, criminalize tampering with infrastructure, strengthen coordination with industry, strengthen repair capacity, and engage in cable diplomacy by working closely with regional neighbors, including Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, and ASEAN members, but also global partners such as the EU. Regional coast guard cooperation and information sharing, as well as joint development of surveillance technology, could be vital components of such partnerships.

While my visit was short, it provided a great opportunity to meet colleagues, make new friends, and gain a first impression of Taipei.