Over the last week I had a series of engagements with the maritime security community in Türkiye.
The annual conference of the NATO Maritime Security Center of Excellence in Istanbul is an increasingly important thinking space for developing strategy on maritime security. This year’s focus was on the grey zone and I had the pleasure to act for the second time as the conference’s academic advisor. Key points:
Whether it is sabotage of infrastructure, spoofing and jamming, shadow fleets, or attacks on shipping, the grey zone is increasingly defining the maritime security agenda.
As stressed in my opening and closing remarks at the conference, we need to develop our conceptual vocabulary on the grey zone, think through the ‘black and whites’ categories involved, and tailor responses.
I also gave a presentation at the gathering of the European Tugowners Association in Istanbul. The event reflected on the consequences of maritime security for the industry. Key point:
Tugboat operations are vital for the transport industry, but are mainly invisible. Yet, they might be more crucial for maritime security than often considered.
Last was a conference organized by DEHUKAM in Ankara as part of the run-up to the 2026 NATO summit. We focused on the lessons from the situation in the Black Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Key points:
It’s important that NATO develops a clearer understanding of what roles it plays in addressing maritime security in these contexts.
The need to adapt and develop better strategies in light of the proliferation of low-cost and autonomous weapons and grey zone incidents is paramount.
How are navies and the transport industry coping with ongoing uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz and wider Western Indian Ocean?
Attacks on shipping, the US naval blockade, mines in the Strait of Hormuz, but also the ongoing threat from Houthi forces and the resurgence of piracy combine to create a volatile environment. The negotiations between Iran and the US are ongoing with an uncertain timeline and little prospect for immediate resolution.
Over the last few days, I had the pleasure of participating in the 17th Industry Strategy Meeting (ISM) organized by EU Naval Operation Atalanta in cooperation with Aspides and the Combined Maritime Forces.
The ISM is an established fixture in the annual maritime security calendar, bringing together naval missions operating in the region and representatives of the shipping industry to review threats, risks, and operational effectiveness. Held each spring in Madrid, it forms a pair with the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Meeting (SHADE), which convenes each autumn in the region itself — together providing a rhythm of strategic reflection and operational coordination across the year.
Challenges and Gaps in the current response
Five key insights from the meeting:
(1) The multinational military mission led by France and the UK (which now has the acronym M3 SoH) is being prepared with several naval assets deployed to the region. Planning is now on two levels: a political contact group and military coordination. The current time horizon is 12 months. There is little sign that the shipping industry has been meaningfully consulted, or that questions such as environmental consequences or the long-term legal status and transit regime have been properly addressed.
The maritime domain is facing increasing uncertainty. There is a need to look at the larger strategic picture of how maritime order is changing.
Yesterday, we discussed the Arctic and the Strait of Hormuz as two vital and strategic maritime regions at a public event organized by the Academy of International Affairs NRW in Bonn.
Key takeaways:
The maritime domain is increasingly becoming a contested and ever more politicized space. Contestation over Greenland, the Panama Canal, but also the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are indicators.
Grey-zone and hybrid threats are prevailing and challenge interpretations of the rules and laws of the sea.
Geopolitical fragmentation and new uncertainty provides opportunities for maritime crime syndicates, as seen in the recent resurgence of Somali piracy.
The Strait of Hormuz exemplifies how the proliferation of low-cost weapon systems challenges conventional understandings of naval dominance and control of waterways.
It is vital to look beyond the immediate and maintain a strategic outlook on how multilateral mechanisms can strengthen maritime order in the light of these challenges.
Given the gridlock at the global level, regional and minilateral initiatives will be key to ensuring maritime security.
What are the larger strategic consequences of the Strait of Hormuz crisis? During my visit to Geneva last Friday, I had the opportunity to discuss this question at two events.
I gave a presentation on the Strait at a maritime roundtable organized by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. I highlighted that we are facing long-term instability, not only in the Gulf region but also across the maritime domain more broadly. Grey-zone warfare, lawfare, and attempts to exert political control over key waterways are becoming increasingly common patterns.
It is important to start thinking about long-term political solutions for the Strait of Hormuz, including a formal, legally binding transit regime. The discussion also underscored that international law relevant to this situation remains underdeveloped, particularly with regard to straits and naval warfare. Also, questions of environmental security and the situation of seafarers currently do not receive sufficient attention.
One Ocean Week in Bergen, Norway, was a great gathering of ocean entrepreneurs, industry leaders, and policymakers. I had the pleasure of presenting the opening keynote at the One Ocean Summit and participating in two panels. Here are my key takeaways:
While the oceans have received unprecedented political attention, discussions on peace and security, ocean health, and the blue economy remain disconnected.
We should move beyond current discussions of dual use and instead develop multi-use systems—ones that support security while also benefiting the economy, conservation, science, and people.
To improve maritime security governance, global (UN), regional seas, and national responses need to be better coordinated.
The everyday, often quiet work of coastguards is essential to strengthening ocean governance. More efforts are needed to build coastguard capacity and enhance cooperation in Europe and beyond.
Global maritime security depends on effective regional institutions. In the Western Indian Ocean, a major building block is the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) — a platform connecting 21 countries from the Eastern African shore, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf.
What’s the state of play of this grouping of states? Over the last few days, I participated in a seminar in Mombasa, Kenya, organized by the U.S. Africa Center for Strategic Studies to find out.
How does DCoC operate?
The DCoC continues to serve as a platform for maritime law enforcement professionals and maritime authorities, facilitated by the International Maritime Organization — the United Nations’ shipping regulator. Created in 2009 to contribute to the fight against piracy, its mandate was later expanded to cover maritime crime more broadly. Over the years, the platform has matured institutionally, developing a steering committee and three working groups.
In essence, the DCoC has two main purposes:
To set standards for how member states organize their maritime security governance and to enable coordination among them,
To coordinate the delivery of capacity building.
The organization has clearly progressed in developing standards, yet national implementation remains limited. Capacity-building coordination is important but highly intricate, given divergent donor interests and political considerations.
What are the challenges?
The DCoC continues to pursue ambitious plans, yet regional meetings alone will not be enough to realize them. National politics, resource constraints, funding limitations, and diverging priorities remain difficult hurdles to overcome.
Another persistent challenge is how the DCoC interacts with other regional platforms. The interfaces between the DCoC and the Regional Maritime Security Architecture — a well-functioning, smaller cooperation framework between seven Eastern African states led by the Indian Ocean Commission and funded by the European Union — are becoming increasingly well organized.
However, linkages to other regional maritime security entities, ranging from the Gulf Cooperation Council and India’s regional information-sharing center to the Nairobi Convention, the Combined Maritime Forces or the Indian Ocean Rim Association remain ambiguous and underdeveloped.
Will geopolitical fragmentation impact the partnership?
While not yet immediately visible at the meeting I attended, the DCoC will not escape broader geopolitical fragmentation. This includes relations among member states and their neighbors, dynamics involving India and Pakistan, South Africa’s geopolitical positioning, and the evolving role of the United States in the region — not least in light of the recent Gulf War.
Stewardship by a United Nations agency will remain important to move this platform forward. At the same time, it raises the question of whether the region might benefit from smaller, more functional cooperation frameworks — potentially decoupling Red Sea and Gulf security from the distinct challenges and needs of African coastal states.
Another pathway would be to continue the process of institutional maturation and begin treating DCoC agreements as a form of regional customary law. Whether national legislatures are ready to move in that direction remains uncertain.
Back from maritime security discussions in New York. Some key observations:
The situation in the Persian Gulf is unsurprisingly dominating the agenda at the UN. The historic consensus around Security Council Resolution 2817, co-sponsored by no less than 136 countries, documents that the UN and the Security Council have to play a major role in resolving the war.
Bringing shipping back to the Strait of Hormuz is a top priority, but will be tricky. The Secretary-General’s new initiative to establish a humanitarian mechanism for shipping fertilizer is a beacon of hope. It could be a starting point for restoring trust and confidence and provide the seeds for a more sustainable arrangement.
Planning for post-conflict scenarios for the Strait of Hormuz is under way. Several scenarios are discussed at high levels. The first UN maritime peace operation is one option on the table. All of this can only start once a ceasefire is in place.
Importantly, the current crisis feeds the momentum that the UN system requires a more sustained and strategic approach to maritime security. The strong consensus to act became visible during the two high-level debates last year. Delighted to learn that Bahrain will drive the debate forward during its April presidency.
I had the pleasure of briefing the UN Task Force on Security Sector Reform on how UN-level maritime security work can be better coordinated. For the task force, the sea is one of its eight priorities. Small steps so far, but very important and promising. I hope we will see more from the taskforce.
Thanks to the delegations that took time out from their busy schedules to meet me. Special thanks to Thomas Tödtling and Christophe Pradier for their leadership in pushing forward the agenda.
Looking forward to visiting the city again soon to feed in ideas for this important debate.
Southeast Asia has long been a region of maritime security innovation. A key driver was the maritime piracy crisis in the late 2000s.
A key regional governance mechanism originating from that time is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and its associated Information Sharing Centre (ISC). ReCAAP is one of the few legally binding and well institutionalized regional maritime security frameworks that has served as a role model for arrangements such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct in the Western Indian Ocean and the Yaoundé Code of Conduct in the Gulf of Guinea.
ReCAAP’s main function is to provide a clearing house for piracy-related information and to analyze available incident data. It’s key strength is to ensure high level of awareness and understanding of piracy in the region, even if threat levels are low. The centre’s work is moreover important in capacity building and the exchange of lessons across global ocean regions.
Held annually in the first week of March the EU Ocean Days are the EU’s spectacle showcasing its work related to the sea. It is, moreover, an opportunity for the EU institutions to engage in stakeholder dialogues.
My visit to the 2026 edition confirmed: the attention to the oceans by the various EU institutions is impressive. Yet, the focus is multi-directional. As we have discussed in a recent book chapter, the flurry of initiatives risks fragmentation. Indeed, the thicket of programs, policies, and strategies is nearly impossible to navigate. It is hard to imagine that anyone has a complete picture.
Particularly encouraging was the emphasis on data collection, sharing, and fusion for ocean health, the blue economy, and maritime security. The announcement of significant funding for the OceanEye initiative was a clear highlight. For the first time the event also featured sessions on maritime security, led by by the dedicated team in DG Mare.
As part of the week, I organized a side event together with Paul Trautendorfer of JPI Oceans. Continuing my work on information sharing, at this stakeholder dialogue event we investigated how the EU’s approach to ocean observation and maritime domain awareness can be better harmonized and streamlined. Our background paper showed that more than 15 platforms are currently funded by the EU.
The discussion highlighted the need for stronger efforts in
ocean data meta-governance,
greater awareness of the different platforms and their strengths and weaknesses, and
better bridges between the scientific, conservation, safety, and defense communities.
It was a pleasure to contribute to an innovative EU-Indonesia track 1.5 dialogue this week.
Track 1.5 dialogues are a conventional tool in diplomacy. In Southeast Asia they are even one of the main modes of diplomatic negotiations – known as the ‘ASEAN way’. Mixing participants from ministries of foreign affairs, governmental research organizations and independent think tanks, their primarily objective is usually trust and confidence building, developing interpersonal networks, but also epistemic alignments: open exchanges on problem interpretation, current and planned policies, recent developments and plans. Chatham house rules are usually applied and participants are asked to make frank remarks or ask critical questions, which could otherwise violate diplomatic conventions. If and how such events are effective and trickle down to formal track 1.0 diplomatic negotiations is often debated, but in the end very difficult to measure.
This week I participated in the EU-Indonesia track 1.5 dialogue. Mainly concerned about the implications of the recent comprehensive trade treaty, the event was noteworthy as the EU tried out a new format: strategic foresight. In what might be described as “foresight diplomacy”, the focus of the event was on exchanges on foresight expertise.
Strategic foresight is a planning approach that has become increasingly popular in the defense sector, economic policy making, but also the commercial sector. As a methodology it is focused on the management of risk by identifying mega trends and scenarios. Contrary to forecasting, multiple futures are anticipated and evaluated for their plausibility in participative processes. The goal of planning is preparedness and resilience. Both the OECD and NATO have developed important guidelines for carrying out such analyses and the EU and Indonesia, but also many others, have developed foresight capacities in their diplomatic services.
Foresight diplomacy is focused on the systematic exchange not only of experience, but also the outcomes of foresight exercises. Comparisons between meta trends, scenarios and resulting gaps and planning priorities serve as the basis for not only epistemic alignment, but also identifying common interests and collective action space.
According to the organizers the event that I attended was one of the first in which the EU, led by the foresight unit in the European External Action Service and its partner – Forward Global –, tested this approach. While there’s a risk that foresight diplomacy dialogues become methods driven and technocratic, they might be extremely useful to overcome the short-termism and news focus that too often prevails at track 1.5 dialogues. I look forward to following how the EU continues to advance this innovative form of diplomacy.
