Enhancing maritime domain awareness (MDA) is one of the corner stones of maritime security. Yet, it only works if countries develop a culture of sharing and collaboration across agencies and regional seas.
Practicing MDA through multi-national exercises is a key component of developing such a culture. As part of my ongoing research on the international practice of exercises, last week I had the opportunity to get some first hand experience of how the U.S. navy aims at advancing regional MDA . I participated in the exercise SEACAT 2024.
SEACAT is one of the oldest MDA exercises. Starting as a counter-terrorism exercise in 2002, it was focused on MDA through the 2016 Maritime Security Initiative, and was broadened to the Indo-Pacific in 2019. Over that history it has grown in size, with 2024 seeing more than 200 participants, including many from outside Southeast Asia. What happens at such exercises? What can be learned from them?
A larger report is in the making, yet here are some take away points:
๐ฉ๐๐ ๐ด๐ฒ๐๐ ๐บ๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ฑ๐ถ๐ณ๐ณ๐ถ๐ฐ๐๐น๐ ๐๐ผ ๐ต๐ถ๐ฑ๐ฒ. MDA systems have become more and more sophisticated. While the Automated Identification System (AIS) continues to be the baseline, in particular satellite data (optical and Radio Frequency emissions) rapidly changes what maritime activities are detected. Dark vessels engaged in illicit operations are easier to identify.
๐ฉ๐ง๐ต๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฒ’๐ ๐ฎ ๐ฝ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฒ ๐๐ผ ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐.ย The Seavision platform for data sharing, fusion and analysis by the U.S. Navy continues to be the most advanced MDA tool. Yet, access to the platform is controlled by the US and implies that the navy is able to listen. The alternative developed by the EU’s CRIMARIO II project is great for privacy in communication, but implies less data availability. Commercial platforms, such as the one by the New Zealand start-up Starboard Maritime Intelligence presented at the event are increasingly viable alternatives.
๐ฉ๐ ๐๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐บ๐ฎ๐ถ๐ป๐๐๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฎ๐บ. If ten years ago, significant efforts were required to explain why MDA matters and how it informs all levels of maritime security, today this is common wisdom. All countries of the region have made enormous efforts to organize their maritime security governance around dedicated MDA centers.
๐ฉ๐๐ป๐ณ๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐๐ฟ๐๐ฐ๐๐๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐ผ๐ป ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ด๐ถ๐ผ๐ป๐ฎ๐น ๐ฎ๐ด๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐ฎ.ย Attacks on the North Stream and Baltic Connector pipelines, and the cable fault caused by the RubyMar in the Red Sea have brought much attention to critical maritime infrastructure protection in Europe and North America. SEACAT featured the theme prominently, which is an indicator that the threat to subsea cables, pipelines, and energy installations is now also taken seriously in the region.
๐ฉ ๐ฆ๐๐๐๐๐ง ๐ถ๐ ๐ป๐ผ๐ ๐ผ๐ป๐น๐ ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐ผ๐๐ ๐ ๐๐.ย What lasting impact exercises such as SEACAT have on the information actually shared is difficult to assess. Yet, the exercise has also other benefits, such as developing global maritime security priorities and vocabularies, mutual understanding and reassurance, signaling towards China, strengthening Southeast Asia’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific, and inter-personal networks which speed up communications and incident responses. Exercises are an important ingredient of what Tim Edmunds and I call in our book ‘informal maritime security governance’.