What’s the state of progress and arising challenges for maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean? From 14.-16.11. I had the pleasure to follow large parts of a ministerial conference addressing this issue in Mauritius online. I chaired one session on the first day and provided comments in the concluding sessions.
Below is the write up of my intervention:
Towards holistic maritime security: Finetuning the maritime security system in the Western Indian Ocean
Maritime security solutions in the Western Indian Ocean have made significant progress. A decade after the crisis caused by piracy attacks in the region, a sustainable and well-functioning maritime security structure has been built.
While often referred to as a maritime security ‘architecture’, this term seems no longer appropriate. An architecture is a metaphor that points to a project in planning and construction. Maritime security has progressed in the region to a degree, that it is now better to refer to a ‘system’ – a system that needs to be finetuned and improved, but which has been well established.
While the global attention for the oceans continues to be unprecedented, maritime security and critical maritime infrastructure protection lack an institutional home within the United Nations system. While different UN agencies deal with aspects of the agenda, the debate is dispersed and lacks a holistic outlook. This includes the International Maritime Organization, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the Food and Agricultural Organization, the UN Environment Programme, the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction or the UN Conference on Trade and Development. Maritime security has also been high on the agenda of the UN Security Council. This risks global fragmentation and the question of the relation between regional and global ocean governance continues to be unsettled.
On November 9th I had the pleasure to discuss with UN bodies in Geneva how this situation can be addressed.
Over the last ten days I was with the team of the Ocean Infrastructure Research Group in Mauritius. Together we advanced the draft of our forthcoming book on ocean infrastructure and conducted field work on the 2020 Wakashio oil spill, which is one of our case studies.
In the book we develop a new understanding of global ocean politics by developing a framework centered on infrastructure. We argue that the concept of infrastructure opens productive new avenues for understanding global ocean politics that allows us to overcome the limits of thinking centered on territory, freedom or global commons. We show the evolution of the oceans as an infrastructural space, and show how we can rethink power, law, security and knowledge infrastructurally.
Public event on shipping risks
Fieldwork on shipping risks in small islands
Part of our stay in Mauritius was also a stakeholder workshop and a public event on shipping risks and the lessons from the 2020 Wakashio shipping accident which caused a major environmental disaster in the country. The event was covered in the national newspapers, and we also met with a range of stakeholders individually, including the minister on blue economy, fishing and shipping.
Field visit guided by EcoSud
A particular important experience was a field visit to the site where the accident happened and the coastal region where the oil was spilled. The visit was organized by the local NGO EcoSud. It revealed that the clean up is completed, but that the disaster has some visible and lasting impact on the coastal eco-system, and there continues to be residues of oil in the mangrove forests. In other words, the disaster is not over, but will have to be managed carefully in the years to come.
Over the next two weeks I will be giving a range of talks in Thailand and Singapore. On the 12th I am attending the Southeast Asia Maritime Law Enforcement Initiative (SEAMLEI), 9th Annual Commanders’ Forum and give a talk on the consequences of climate change for maritime security planning and operations.
On the 13th I will be speaking at an event on Critical Maritime Infrastructure Protection in Southeast Asia organized by the National University of Singapore’s Center of International Law. I will focus in particular on the consequences of green energy expansion for Singapore and the South China Sea.
From the 16th I am attending the Regional Maritime Security Practitioner Programme (RMPP) of the Singapore Navy. The Programme is one of the capstone events of the Information Fusion Center in Singapore and brings together over 100 participants from across the world. It is one of the world’s largest gatherings of maritime security practitioners and maritime domain awareness specialists. At the event, I will be giving a presentation on current trends in maritime security drawing on our book forthcoming with Oxford University Press (with Tim Edmunds) and chair a panel on current threats in the region.
Ireland is an island, and its security is dependent on the sea. On June 22nd I had the opportunity to contribute to the countries ongoing Consultative Forum on International Security Policy. The goal of the forum is to inform the public debate about the future options of the countries security policy and its tradition of neutrality.
In my contribution, some of which is summarized in this article, I stressed that Ireland is in a new era because it’s dependency on maritime infrastructure is increasing, and the Nord Stream attacks demonstrates that it is vulnerable. I emphasized the importance of close cooperation in the region within the EU and in mini-lateral formats.
As part of the presidency of the European Council, Sweden is inviting the members of the Council working group on maritime security for an away day. The program focuses on the future of maritime security, the Baltic Sea, as well as a range of social, cultural and military-related visits and activities. The event takes place in Karlskrona, the main Swedish naval base in the Baltic, and a city with a long maritime heritage, 13-15.7.2023.
Participating in the event, I am giving a talk on critical maritime infrastructure protection in Europe with a focus on the North Sea, as well as participating in a roundtable on the future of maritime security in the EU.
Over the last couple of days, I had the pleasure to attend the International Maritime Security Conference (IMSC) organized by the Singapore navy.
The conference is a bi-annual heads of navy meeting accompanied by a defense exhibition (Imdex), a fleet show, as well as side events organized by the maritime security program by RSIS. The conference might not have an iconic name, but is the most important gathering of navies and maritime security experts in the region. It was my second time attending.
From the 3rd to the 5th of May, I will have the pleasure to attend the International Maritime Conference, organized by RSIS and the Singapore navy.
I am also scheduled to attend a series of side events focused on different aspects of maritime security in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific. The conference provides an ideal opportunity to gauge where the maritime security debate in the region is heading.
The global subsea data cable industry meets in different formats, one of which is the International Cable Protection Committee. The ICPC is a key body that provide a forum for information exchange on technical, legal, and environmental aspects of submarine cables and issues recommendations to its members, other stakeholders and governments.
From the 17th to 20th of April, I will attend the annual ICPC meeting in Madrid. This is part of our research in the Ocean Infrastructure Research Group, and our investigation of the politics of submarine cables in particular.
At the event I will be presenting our research on cable politics, with a particular focus on recent surveillance initiatives, known as Maritime Domain Awareness, and the new focus on critical maritime infrastructure protection in the light of the 2022 Nord Stream attacks.
The European Union is in the process of drafting a new Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and critical maritime infrastructures is one of the issues it will address.
While the European Commission and the External Action Service are busy in developing a first draft of the strategy, a Working Party of the European Council is discussing what the strategy must focus on. Under the Swedish presidency of the Council, Member States will review and refine the first draft, which is expected to be issued as a communique in March this year. The final strategy is likely to be expected in autumn.
Briefing in Brussels
On February 15th, I had the pleasure to brief the Working Party at their meeting in Brussels. In my briefing, I first drew attention to the importance of maritime security strategy. Relying on research conducted with Tim Edmunds, I argued that strategies are key to deal with the complexity of maritime security, distribute roles and responsibilities, but also to agree on new challenges.
Three challenges are very important in this context: 1) how to response to geopolitical shifts, including the increasing use of grey zone tactics at sea, lawfare, and other disruptions, 2) how to relate the maritime security agenda to the climate and biodiversity crisis in the ocean, and ensure that maritime security forces contribute and revisit their roles, 3) how to protect critical maritime infrastructures.
Critical Maritime Infrastructure Protection
In the second part I discussed critical maritime infrastructure protection. I revisited the research we have done for the European Parliament in 2022, as well as the consequences and aftermath of the Nordstream attack. Zooming in on subsea data cables, I firstly argued that the cable system is not one, but several problems, and hence complex to deal with. The table below shows that analysis.
Not one, but six problems
I then demonstrated how the EUMSS can make important steps to improve the protection and resilience of critical maritime infrastructures. Firstly, maritime infrastructures, should not be subsumed as a ‘sector’ under the critical infrastructure protection agenda, since the legal and political context is radically different to that on land. Secondly, awareness and education must be improved, to ensure that there is a proper understanding of how maritime infrastructures work.
Thirdly, a coordination body in the EU is required to ensure the exchange of information, best practices, harmonize laws across the EU, and facilitate a productive dialogue with the industry. Fourthly, existing maritime domain awareness and surveillance instruments, such as those of the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) must be used more effectively. Fifthly, given the inter-dependencies of the global cable network, the EU must seek strategic dialogue with countries, including the United Kingdom, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco on how to ensure cable protection. Finally, the EU should pursue a ‘deterrence-by-denial’ strategy and improve the capacities available for rapid response and repairing infrastructures.
