Over the last week I had a series of engagements with the maritime security community in Türkiye.
The annual conference of the NATO Maritime Security Center of Excellence in Istanbul is an increasingly important thinking space for developing strategy on maritime security. This year’s focus was on the grey zone and I had the pleasure to act for the second time as the conference’s academic advisor. Key points:
Whether it is sabotage of infrastructure, spoofing and jamming, shadow fleets, or attacks on shipping, the grey zone is increasingly defining the maritime security agenda.
As stressed in my opening and closing remarks at the conference, we need to develop our conceptual vocabulary on the grey zone, think through the ‘black and whites’ categories involved, and tailor responses.
I also gave a presentation at the gathering of the European Tugowners Association in Istanbul. The event reflected on the consequences of maritime security for the industry. Key point:
Tugboat operations are vital for the transport industry, but are mainly invisible. Yet, they might be more crucial for maritime security than often considered.
Last was a conference organized by DEHUKAM in Ankara as part of the run-up to the 2026 NATO summit. We focused on the lessons from the situation in the Black Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Key points:
It’s important that NATO develops a clearer understanding of what roles it plays in addressing maritime security in these contexts.
The need to adapt and develop better strategies in light of the proliferation of low-cost and autonomous weapons and grey zone incidents is paramount.
How are navies and the transport industry coping with ongoing uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz and wider Western Indian Ocean?
Attacks on shipping, the US naval blockade, mines in the Strait of Hormuz, but also the ongoing threat from Houthi forces and the resurgence of piracy combine to create a volatile environment. The negotiations between Iran and the US are ongoing with an uncertain timeline and little prospect for immediate resolution.
Over the last few days, I had the pleasure of participating in the 17th Industry Strategy Meeting (ISM) organized by EU Naval Operation Atalanta in cooperation with Aspides and the Combined Maritime Forces.
The ISM is an established fixture in the annual maritime security calendar, bringing together naval missions operating in the region and representatives of the shipping industry to review threats, risks, and operational effectiveness. Held each spring in Madrid, it forms a pair with the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction Meeting (SHADE), which convenes each autumn in the region itself — together providing a rhythm of strategic reflection and operational coordination across the year.
Challenges and Gaps in the current response
Five key insights from the meeting:
(1) The multinational military mission led by France and the UK (which now has the acronym M3 SoH) is being prepared with several naval assets deployed to the region. Planning is now on two levels: a political contact group and military coordination. The current time horizon is 12 months. There is little sign that the shipping industry has been meaningfully consulted, or that questions such as environmental consequences or the long-term legal status and transit regime have been properly addressed.
Somali piracy is back. In the space of just a few weeks in April and May 2026, at least five vessels have been seized off the Somali coast and nearby waters. The oil tanker Honour 25, loaded with 18,000 barrels of crude and crewed by 17 seafarers from across Asia, was hijacked off Puntland on April 21. The cargo ship Sward was taken days later near Garacad, its fifteen-person crew locked up while nine armed pirates took control. The UAE-flagged dhow Fahad-4 was seized and repurposed as a mother ship — a floating base from which pirates could range across hundreds of miles of open ocean — before being abandoned when supplies ran out. The Togo-flagged tanker Eureka was captured off Yemen and steered toward Somali shores.
The Joint Maritime Information Centre has raised its threat level to “severe.” The conditions for a prolonged crisis are in place.
None of this should surprise us. In a 2024 commentary, I warned that piracy was returning and that the governance structures built to contain it had quietly eroded. The warning signs were already clear in late 2023.
The threat appeared to recede. But the underlying conditions were never addressed. Pirates watched, waited, and reorganised.
Five factors explaining the return
What has changed between then and now? Five factors, layered on top of each other, have created the opening that pirate networks in Puntland are exploiting.
The first factor is the de-facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Somali piracy networks are not single-purpose criminal enterprises; they operate across multiple illicit economies, including smuggling through the strait. Denied that revenue stream, criminal financiers are redirecting toward hijacking and ransom.
Second, the broader economic fallout from the US-Israel war on Iran has simultaneously pushed up fuel and food prices across the Horn of Africa, straining coastal communities in Puntland that have historically supplied both recruits and logistical support. When people have no income and no prospects, maritime crime becomes an employer of last resort.
Third, US cuts to development assistance and reductions in UN programme funding have eliminated what limited economic alternatives existed. Counter-piracy experts have long argued that sustainable suppression requires onshore investment — in livelihoods, governance, local institutions. Strip that away, and deterrents at sea become harder to sustain.
The fourth is US disengagement. Washington has reduced its naval contribution to counter-piracy and, more damagingly, has likely scaled back the support that gave the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and its counter-piracy task force its genuine operational bite. On paper, CMF remains a 47-nation partnership. In practice, its effectiveness has always depended on American backbone — and that backbone is being quietly pulled.
What are the larger strategic consequences of the Strait of Hormuz crisis? During my visit to Geneva last Friday, I had the opportunity to discuss this question at two events.
I gave a presentation on the Strait at a maritime roundtable organized by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. I highlighted that we are facing long-term instability, not only in the Gulf region but also across the maritime domain more broadly. Grey-zone warfare, lawfare, and attempts to exert political control over key waterways are becoming increasingly common patterns.
It is important to start thinking about long-term political solutions for the Strait of Hormuz, including a formal, legally binding transit regime. The discussion also underscored that international law relevant to this situation remains underdeveloped, particularly with regard to straits and naval warfare. Also, questions of environmental security and the situation of seafarers currently do not receive sufficient attention.
Global maritime security depends on effective regional institutions. In the Western Indian Ocean, a major building block is the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) — a platform connecting 21 countries from the Eastern African shore, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf.
What’s the state of play of this grouping of states? Over the last few days, I participated in a seminar in Mombasa, Kenya, organized by the U.S. Africa Center for Strategic Studies to find out.
How does DCoC operate?
The DCoC continues to serve as a platform for maritime law enforcement professionals and maritime authorities, facilitated by the International Maritime Organization — the United Nations’ shipping regulator. Created in 2009 to contribute to the fight against piracy, its mandate was later expanded to cover maritime crime more broadly. Over the years, the platform has matured institutionally, developing a steering committee and three working groups.
In essence, the DCoC has two main purposes:
To set standards for how member states organize their maritime security governance and to enable coordination among them,
To coordinate the delivery of capacity building.
The organization has clearly progressed in developing standards, yet national implementation remains limited. Capacity-building coordination is important but highly intricate, given divergent donor interests and political considerations.
What are the challenges?
The DCoC continues to pursue ambitious plans, yet regional meetings alone will not be enough to realize them. National politics, resource constraints, funding limitations, and diverging priorities remain difficult hurdles to overcome.
Another persistent challenge is how the DCoC interacts with other regional platforms. The interfaces between the DCoC and the Regional Maritime Security Architecture — a well-functioning, smaller cooperation framework between seven Eastern African states led by the Indian Ocean Commission and funded by the European Union — are becoming increasingly well organized.
However, linkages to other regional maritime security entities, ranging from the Gulf Cooperation Council and India’s regional information-sharing center to the Nairobi Convention, the Combined Maritime Forces or the Indian Ocean Rim Association remain ambiguous and underdeveloped.
Will geopolitical fragmentation impact the partnership?
While not yet immediately visible at the meeting I attended, the DCoC will not escape broader geopolitical fragmentation. This includes relations among member states and their neighbors, dynamics involving India and Pakistan, South Africa’s geopolitical positioning, and the evolving role of the United States in the region — not least in light of the recent Gulf War.
Stewardship by a United Nations agency will remain important to move this platform forward. At the same time, it raises the question of whether the region might benefit from smaller, more functional cooperation frameworks — potentially decoupling Red Sea and Gulf security from the distinct challenges and needs of African coastal states.
Another pathway would be to continue the process of institutional maturation and begin treating DCoC agreements as a form of regional customary law. Whether national legislatures are ready to move in that direction remains uncertain.
The Strait of Hormuz is vital for the global economy, the longer it stays closed the higher the risks. Yet, returning to normal will be difficult.
In my most recent commentary, published with Global Observatory, I look at mid-term scenarios. A UN Security Council mandate, or even a maritime UN Peacekeeping mission, could be key. Leadership from the EU will be needed.
Continuing my tour of the world’s leading maritime domain awareness centers, I had the pleasure of visiting the Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) last week. The center is an initiative by the Indian Navy to improve information sharing and understanding of maritime security dynamics.
IFC-IOR is modeled after the Singapore Navy’s Information Fusion Center. It is staffed by Indian Navy personnel as well as International Liaison Officers from the Indian Ocean region from currently 15 countries. Closely linked to India’s national maritime fusion center (IMAC), the IFC-IOR’s backbone is an information fusion platform named ‘Mantra’.
Overall, the center performs four main functions:
It provides reports on maritime security incidents at regular intervals to provide accurate information on patterns of maritime security threats with a focus on the Indian Ocean region as well as the Gulf of Guinea.
The center provides support to regional maritime operations by the Indian Navy, including incidents of piracy or search and rescue missions.
It engages in regional capacity building activities and training through workshops on maritime domain awareness and information sharing.
Confidence building and naval diplomacy through building relations with international and regional maritime security forces is another major task.
In acting as a regional maritime information clearinghouse, high-level reporting is currently the IFC-IOR’s strongest contribution to the regional maritime security architecture.
Like other centers and platforms, the IFC-IOR faces the challenges of how to better integrate with other initiatives, including the four centers that form SHADE’s Single Information Framework. Another challenge lies in how to automate work, and move from information sharing to enhancing operations through prediction.
In regional terms, the center will also need to strengthen its role in supporting coordinated regional maritime security operations, including those led by its neighbors or organized in the framework of the Regional Maritime Security Architecture.
Small island states are at the frontier of maritime security and ocean conservation—a reality I experienced firsthand during my recent visit to the Maldives.
Consisting of more than 1,200 tiny islands, the country relies on inland waterways as its main transport routes, while resort tourism drives the economy. Tuna is the staple food and features in almost all local dishes.
In meetings with the Coast Guard and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I learned about the challenges of managing and safeguarding the maritime economy. While the coast guard is capable and well-equipped, the vast threat landscape makes stronger regional cooperation urgent.
The primary purpose of my visit was to participate in the Theveli Conference, the annual flagship event of the The Maldives National University (MNU). This amazing interdisciplinary gathering brings together researchers interested in the nature, society, and politics of the Maldives and other small island states.
In my keynote address, I discussed how academics can contribute to global ocean politics and how we can improve at translating research into policy, drawing on my experience in maritime security and, most recently, in the UN Security Council. Link to video.
I also taught a short course on linking blue economy to maritime security which led to interesting exchanges on what priorities Maldives should aim for.
Moreover, I participated in a roundtable marking the launch of ‘Small States Maritime Security’ by Athaulla (‘Atho’) Rasheed. The book offers an excellent analysis of maritime challenges facing small states—highly recommended reading.
Delighted to learn that the university is launching two degree programmes on ‘ocean governance’ and on ‘small island state security’ which will be unique educational opportunities in the region.
I look forward to returning to explore more of the islands and their remarkable marine life. Unfortunately, my schedule was too busy, and there wasn’t any time for snorkeling.
Our new book titled the ‘Politics of Global Ocean Regions’ is now available through Springer. Edited with Elizabeth Mendenhall and Rebecca Strating, the book advances a novel analytical framework for studying the politics of global ocean regions, shedding new light on the complex interactions in ocean spaces such as the Arctic, Indo-Pacific, and Indian Ocean.
We want to show that the oceans are not just vast expanses of blue, but dynamic political spaces shaped by complex regional dynamics. This work is the outcome of a three year research collaboration with leading experts across different ocean regions. It includes chapters by by William Waqavakatoga, Joanne Wallis, Samuel Bashfield, Leandra R. Gonçalves, Ana Flávia Barros-Platiau, Carlos Henrique Tomé, Carina Costa de Oliveira, and Andreas Østhagen, as well as by the three editors.
Written for students, researchers, and analysts interested in regionalism and ocean governance, this comprehensive study:
Presents a novel framework for analyzing ocean regions as political spaces
Examines the emergence, organization, and effects of global ocean regions
Demonstrates the importance and complexity of regional maritime politics
Provides essential insights for understanding the governance of global commons
I hope this work will serve as an essential resource for understanding how diverse and complex regional maritime politics shape our world, providing a valuable framework to guide future research in this critical field.
🌊 The maritime security architecture in the Western Indian Ocean has developed new pace since the emergence of Houthi attacks on commercial shipping and the resurgence of Somali piracy activities last year. This week I attended the naval coordination SHADE conference in Bahrain, where these critical developments took center stage.
SHADE in full work mode
🤝 SHADE serves as a vital interface between the complex network of multinational and independent naval forces and the shipping industry. The EU’s Operation Atalanta and the US led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) co-host this forum which has evolved from its original focus on piracy to become a comprehensive annual dialogue.
📊 It has now upscaled activities and launched three working groups dedicated to intelligence, information sharing, and operations. The key objectives are to give better advice to shipping, improve flow of information, and develop better emergency response coordination, including oil spill prevention.
SHADE is working towards what it calls a ‘Single Information Environment’. This could streamline information flow across the six information sharing centers focused on the region. A corner piece is a center started in 2024 – the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) – which supports the CMF.
The European Union’s continued commitment
🇪🇺 The European Union continues to demonstrate strong commitment to regional maritime security. Operation Atalanta’s mandate has been renewed for two years, and its sister operation, Aspides, is expected to be extended until 2026.
There are expectations that the two EU operations will be merged soon. Anticipating this merger, the EU has rebranded its information sharing center. It now runs under the name of Maritime Security Center Indian Ocean (MSCIO), serves both operations and has a brand new website.
CMF and regional contributions
🌏 CMF, which is organized in different task forces and remains focused on nonstate threats on the high seas, has expanded its membership significantly, turning it into an important umbrella organization under US leadership.
🌏 Regional leadership in maritime security has also grown impressively: India has emerged as a pivotal maritime security provider; the Indian Ocean Commission’s two centers have become key operational pillars, coordinating responses among Eastern African states; and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCOC) has evolved into a more effective capacity building coordination mechanism.
⚓ As I highlighted in my presentation: Though this new momentum is encouraging, maritime security threats persist, and shipping attacks continue to pose challenges. Success requires sustained engagement and investment with a long-term perspective.
