Christian Bueger

Too important to fail. Insights from the DCoC high level meeting

The Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) is too important to fail. But the recent high-level meeting in Madagascar showed how far its ambitions have outrun implementation, funding, and coordination with other regional mechanisms.

With piracy and narcotics smuggling surging in the Western Indian Ocean, the stronger the DCoC is, the better.

Signed in 2009 and amended in 2017, the code covers the Western Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden. It has become an important platform for building trust between signatory states and has helped establish regulatory standards. Under the International Maritime Organization, its secretariat has also mobilised significant resources for capacity building.

Three concerns stood out.

1. Ambition is outrunning implementation

The secretariat presented new plans, including a Common Lexicon, a threat register, and a maritime security strategy and implementation plan. They are well drafted and useful in principle. But can these documents really change the practices of states as different as Madagascar and Saudi Arabia? The targets will most likely not be met on schedule.

No detailed reporting on states’ progress was delivered, and several states did not attend. That makes it hard to judge what works and where the gaps are.

2. Funding is running dry

The trust fund is nearly depleted, and donors are no longer willing to write blank cheques where the direct impact on maritime security is not guaranteed. The code’s methodology and sustainability need to be rethought.

3. Duplication risks

The region’s maritime security ecosystem is rich and crowded. The clearest overlap is with the Regional Maritime Security Architecture (RMSA) under the Indian Ocean Commission. Built on legally binding documents, it successfully runs two centres for information sharing and operational coordination.

The DCoC’s information sharing has been deconflicted with the RMSA through a memorandum of understanding, but operational coordination has not. The relatively new Working Group 3 has proposed a maritime task force, and it is unclear how this will avoid duplicating the RMSA’s work.

Relations with the Nairobi Convention, SHADE, the Single Information Framework, and the Combined Maritime Forces also need to be clarified.

What next?

Prioritise implementation over new documents, agree a clear division of labour with the RMSA before launching a task force, and put funding on a sustainable footing with direct contributions by the signatory states.

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