The maritime domain is facing increasing uncertainty. There is a need to look at the larger strategic picture of how maritime order is changing.
Yesterday, we discussed the Arctic and the Strait of Hormuz as two vital and strategic maritime regions at a public event organized by the Academy of International Affairs NRW in Bonn.
Key takeaways:
The maritime domain is increasingly becoming a contested and ever more politicized space. Contestation over Greenland, the Panama Canal, but also the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb are indicators.
Grey-zone and hybrid threats are prevailing and challenge interpretations of the rules and laws of the sea.
Geopolitical fragmentation and new uncertainty provides opportunities for maritime crime syndicates, as seen in the recent resurgence of Somali piracy.
The Strait of Hormuz exemplifies how the proliferation of low-cost weapon systems challenges conventional understandings of naval dominance and control of waterways.
It is vital to look beyond the immediate and maintain a strategic outlook on how multilateral mechanisms can strengthen maritime order in the light of these challenges.
Given the gridlock at the global level, regional and minilateral initiatives will be key to ensuring maritime security.
Few waterways matter more to the global economy than the Strait of Hormuz—and few are as vulnerable to disruption. Getting shipping flowing again through the Strait of Hormuz is a top priority.
On Friday, the 17th of April, the UK and France convened a head-of-state meeting to discuss a multinational coalition aimed at restoring shipping through the Strait. The level of representation alone signals how seriously the situation is being taken.
Planning is underway, and the coalition is taking shape. Intense discussions over the past week have taken place in four working groups focusing on military coordination, sanctions, humanitarian efforts, and cooperation with the shipping industry. Yet planners should adopt a more comprehensive, long-term outlook.
Why is military protection needed once hostilities end?
Political leaders have stressed that the coalition will only act once a more stable agreement between Iran and the United States is in place and hostilities have ended. Yet even in such a scenario, the shipping industry will still require reassurance from a sustained naval presence.
The UN Security Council will continue its strategic debate on maritime security next week. Bahrain is chairing an open debate on the topic. Much of the discussion is likely to be overshadowed by the tricky situation in the Strait of Hormuz.
However, there are broader issues at stake: How can the UN engage with maritime security and peace in a more sustained and strategic manner? In a new contribution for UNIDIR’s maritime security workstream I show that the UN faces gaps in coordination and analysis.
I propose reform steps, which are modest in ambition, but significant in impact. The UN’s approach would be stronger through:
Global maritime security depends on effective regional institutions. In the Western Indian Ocean, a major building block is the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) — a platform connecting 21 countries from the Eastern African shore, the Red Sea, and the Arabian Gulf.
What’s the state of play of this grouping of states? Over the last few days, I participated in a seminar in Mombasa, Kenya, organized by the U.S. Africa Center for Strategic Studies to find out.
How does DCoC operate?
The DCoC continues to serve as a platform for maritime law enforcement professionals and maritime authorities, facilitated by the International Maritime Organization — the United Nations’ shipping regulator. Created in 2009 to contribute to the fight against piracy, its mandate was later expanded to cover maritime crime more broadly. Over the years, the platform has matured institutionally, developing a steering committee and three working groups.
In essence, the DCoC has two main purposes:
To set standards for how member states organize their maritime security governance and to enable coordination among them,
To coordinate the delivery of capacity building.
The organization has clearly progressed in developing standards, yet national implementation remains limited. Capacity-building coordination is important but highly intricate, given divergent donor interests and political considerations.
What are the challenges?
The DCoC continues to pursue ambitious plans, yet regional meetings alone will not be enough to realize them. National politics, resource constraints, funding limitations, and diverging priorities remain difficult hurdles to overcome.
Another persistent challenge is how the DCoC interacts with other regional platforms. The interfaces between the DCoC and the Regional Maritime Security Architecture — a well-functioning, smaller cooperation framework between seven Eastern African states led by the Indian Ocean Commission and funded by the European Union — are becoming increasingly well organized.
However, linkages to other regional maritime security entities, ranging from the Gulf Cooperation Council and India’s regional information-sharing center to the Nairobi Convention, the Combined Maritime Forces or the Indian Ocean Rim Association remain ambiguous and underdeveloped.
Will geopolitical fragmentation impact the partnership?
While not yet immediately visible at the meeting I attended, the DCoC will not escape broader geopolitical fragmentation. This includes relations among member states and their neighbors, dynamics involving India and Pakistan, South Africa’s geopolitical positioning, and the evolving role of the United States in the region — not least in light of the recent Gulf War.
Stewardship by a United Nations agency will remain important to move this platform forward. At the same time, it raises the question of whether the region might benefit from smaller, more functional cooperation frameworks — potentially decoupling Red Sea and Gulf security from the distinct challenges and needs of African coastal states.
Another pathway would be to continue the process of institutional maturation and begin treating DCoC agreements as a form of regional customary law. Whether national legislatures are ready to move in that direction remains uncertain.
Back in New York for a discussion on the UN’s role in global maritime security.
In 2025, the UN Security Council has held two general high level meetings on maritime security as well as an Arria formula meeting on seafarers. Additionally, dozens of smaller informal meetings were held in New York. The current momentum and the strong consensus of nations to improve maritime security responses, expressed at these events, is unprecedented. It reflects the rapidly evolving maritime challenges, including armed attacks on shipping, substandard shipping to evade sanctions, persistent piracy and smuggling.
At an event co-organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) New York Office and Greece, we discussed what the UN could do better and more effectively. In my intervention, I laid out the challenges:
The oceanic disconnect: Discussions on blue economy and marine conservation, e.g. within the framework of the UN Ocean Conference, are largely disconnected from maritime security debate.
Too many agencies, too little coordination. As identified in our 2024 UNIDIR report, a high number of UN agencies address maritime security through different mandates, with no coordination processes between them.
Capacity building traps. We lack solid understanding of who is training whom in what, and what types of capacity building are lacking.
Data gaps: We are far from a comprehensive global picture of maritime security incidents, trends and patterns. While maritime domain awareness centers provide this on a regional level, no one ensures global data.
Analytical void: There is too little analytical expertise within the UN to ensure that we make sense of patterns and trends, act preventively, and identify the norm deficits of emerging issues.
Following up on my intervention in the Council in May this year, I called for an office dedicated to maritime security. This would act as a clearing house and develop an annual report on the state of maritime security for the Council and General Assembly to consider. It could ensure sustainability, reduce waste of resources, and enhance efficiency.
Other speakers highlighted the need to mainstream maritime security across UN activities, including, e.g. in peace operations, stressed the importance of inter-regional cooperation, and flagged the need for preventive action. Newly emerging challenges were also discussed, including nuclear-powered ships and floating sea mines.
In 2026, countries with strong maritime interest, including Bahrain, Colombia and Liberia, will join the Council. This is likely to generate further momentum for maritime security. Whether the P5—notably Russia and China—will agree to a Council resolution that paves the way to a more structured and sustainable approach remains to be seen.
Yesterday, I attended the 20th Oslo Maritime Security Seminar – the Nordic’s major industry event on the topic.
With more than 300 attendees, highlights included discussions on grey zone strategies, the shadow fleet, and the challenges linked to growing incidents of GNSS spoofing and jamming. I was invited to discuss the state of maritime security governance and presented six observations. Here in brief:
The agenda is evolving rapidly—from terrorism to piracy to smuggling to today’s grey zone threats (cyber, infrastructure attacks, state provocations).
Maritime security is now multidimensional—we’re thinking beyond surface and include subsea infrastructure, space, and cyber. That’s creating new governance complexities.
A new wave of privatization is underway, driven by robotics, new sensors, AI and data fusion. It’s democratizing maritime domain awareness but also creating new dependencies.
There’s a “coastguard revolution”—navies are stepping back from constabulary work, coastguards are stepping up, and this has major implications for maritime investment.
Regional cooperation is intensifying as neighbors work closer together. But so is the risk of fragmented regional governance.
The UN is gaining real momentum on maritime security—three high-level meetings this year, 120+ states in agreement.
🔊 The incoming Council membership – featuring Greece (controlling 17% of global maritime capacity), Denmark (home to Maersk), Panama (world’s largest flag state), Pakistan (regional naval power), and Somalia (maritime security success story) – creates a unique concentration of maritime expertise alongside the permanent members.
💡 This “de facto Maritime Security Council” arrives at a critical moment. From attacks on commercial shipping to cybersecurity threats and environmental challenges, maritime security threats are evolving at an unprecedented pace. No nation can ensure maritime security alone.
Key questions for the Council to discuss: 🔎 Establishing a dedicated maritime security mechanism within the UN system 🔎 Improving frameworks for information sharing and protecting critical maritime infrastructure 🔎 Addressing and coordinating responses to environmental threats in maritime domains
➡️ Read my full analysis on how this unique Council composition could reshape global maritime security governance here.
My latest analysis, published with the Center for Maritime Strategy, highlights the intricate web of maritime security challenges in the Western Indian Ocean. From piracy to drug trafficking, the region faces diverse threats requiring coordinated international response. Despite numerous initiatives, a cohesive security architecture remains elusive due to competing visions and priorities among stakeholders.
I emphasize the crucial role of the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities (CGIMA) as a neutral platform for strategic dialogue. While a unified structure is unlikely, CGIMA offers hope for better coordination and inclusivity. The goal: navigate complexity through open communication and collaboration, ensuring a safer Western Indian Ocean through collective action.
With presentations from Iglika Yakova (DG Mare), Anne Mette Mosekjær Søndergaard (Oersted), Nathalie De Jaeger (Belgian Government), and Izabela Surwillo (Danish Institute for International Studies), we specifically looked into the link between critical maritime infrastructure protection (CMIP) and the blue economy.
Panelists at the EMD roundtable on infrastructure
CMIP allows us to evaluate blue economy ambitions in a new light, since harvesting and preserving ocean resources involves the planning, building and protection of infrastructures. These range from energy platforms, to cables, aquaculture farms to the sensors needed for ocean monitoring and restoration projects.
CMIP emphasizes that the decisive question of contemporary ocean governance is how we protect and care for ocean infrastructures. Such a line of thinking offers opportunities to overcome the fragmentation between discourses of maritime security and the blue economy.
The European Maritime Day is the annual celebration of the European Union to take stock of efforts in developing the blue economy, restoring marine biodiversity and safeguarding marine activities. The 2024 edition took place in Svendborg, Denmark at the Svendborg International Maritime Academy.
Organization by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG Mare), the event attracts more than 1.000 visitors, mainly from, science, technology and government.
