The Strait of Hormuz is vital for the global economy, the longer it stays closed the higher the risks. Yet, returning to normal will be difficult.
In my most recent commentary, published with Global Observatory, I look at mid-term scenarios. A UN Security Council mandate, or even a maritime UN Peacekeeping mission, could be key. Leadership from the EU will be needed.
Continuing the discussion on the Strait of Hormuz, I spoke to CNBC about the importance of the Strait and the options for re-opening it. Military solutions will be limited, and diplomatic negotiations are urgent, which include the shipping industry.
Over the last ten days I was with the team of the Ocean Infrastructure Research Group in Mauritius. Together we advanced the draft of our forthcoming book on ocean infrastructure and conducted field work on the 2020 Wakashio oil spill, which is one of our case studies.
In the book we develop a new understanding of global ocean politics by developing a framework centered on infrastructure. We argue that the concept of infrastructure opens productive new avenues for understanding global ocean politics that allows us to overcome the limits of thinking centered on territory, freedom or global commons. We show the evolution of the oceans as an infrastructural space, and show how we can rethink power, law, security and knowledge infrastructurally.
Public event on shipping risks
Fieldwork on shipping risks in small islands
Part of our stay in Mauritius was also a stakeholder workshop and a public event on shipping risks and the lessons from the 2020 Wakashio shipping accident which caused a major environmental disaster in the country. The event was covered in the national newspapers, and we also met with a range of stakeholders individually, including the minister on blue economy, fishing and shipping.
Field visit guided by EcoSud
A particular important experience was a field visit to the site where the accident happened and the coastal region where the oil was spilled. The visit was organized by the local NGO EcoSud. It revealed that the clean up is completed, but that the disaster has some visible and lasting impact on the coastal eco-system, and there continues to be residues of oil in the mangrove forests. In other words, the disaster is not over, but will have to be managed carefully in the years to come.
In a new commentary published in The Conversation I reflect on the recent reports of Russian spying activities in the North Sea and Baltic Sea region. While there are not many news in these reports, I argue that it implies to pay more attention to the North Sea as a critical security space, and to go beyond surveillance and invest in repair capacities to reduce the threat to infrastructures. Read the commentary here.
The sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines has drawn unprecedented attention to the under water domain and the criticality of subsea infrastructures. Indeed, the world economy depends on the ocean floor as never before in history. It is pipelines, electricity cables, and data cables, that connect the global economy.
An independent commentary on the consequences for the EU was published by The Conversation. A commentary co-authored with Tobias Liebetrau published in The Loop argues that we have to change our perspective of the under water space more generally.
The European Parliament discussed our report on October 6th and announced that our recommendations will inform an action plan on the protection of underwater infrastructures. In response, I published a commentary in EUObserver arguing that the action plan of the commission is not sufficient.
As more and more geopolitical attention turns to the Western Indian Ocean, in a new commentary I explore the role of India in collective maritime security. I argue that India should continue on the course it charted last year in the UN Security Council: to work towards collective multilateral maritime security mechanisms on a regional and global level.
In early 2022 a subtle, but substantial shift took place in the Western Indian Ocean’s security architecture: The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (known as CGPCS) closed shop. It was replaced by a new format. Yet, not much action followed. In a new commentary, I investigates the prospects of the new grouping. Running through four scenarios, I argue that the group is most likely going to become a sleeping beauty.
Reflecting on my recent participation in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) and the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) mechanism, I’ve published a commentary together with Timothy Walker from the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria. We argue that the recent reform of the CGPCS to include other issues than piracy in its agenda is important but that careful thought needs to be put into the question of how deliberations will look like in future. Read the commentary here.