Somali piracy is back. In the space of just a few weeks in April and May 2026, at least five vessels have been seized off the Somali coast and nearby waters. The oil tanker Honour 25, loaded with 18,000 barrels of crude and crewed by 17 seafarers from across Asia, was hijacked off Puntland on April 21. The cargo ship Sward was taken days later near Garacad, its fifteen-person crew locked up while nine armed pirates took control. The UAE-flagged dhow Fahad-4 was seized and repurposed as a mother ship — a floating base from which pirates could range across hundreds of miles of open ocean — before being abandoned when supplies ran out. The Togo-flagged tanker Eureka was captured off Yemen and steered toward Somali shores.
The Joint Maritime Information Centre has raised its threat level to “severe.” The conditions for a prolonged crisis are in place.
None of this should surprise us. In a 2024 commentary, I warned that piracy was returning and that the governance structures built to contain it had quietly eroded. The warning signs were already clear in late 2023.
In November, pirates hijacked the Liberian-flagged Central Park off the Yemeni coast, later recaptured by the US Navy. On December 14, the Maltese-flagged MV Ruen was seized and repurposed — exactly as today’s pirates are doing — as a mother ship. In early January 2024, the MV Lila Norfolk was captured before the Indian Navy moved swiftly to retake it. The decisive response came in March 2024, when Indian special forces intercepted the Ruen, arrested 35 pirates, and freed the crew.
The threat appeared to recede. But the underlying conditions were never addressed. Pirates watched, waited, and reorganised.
Five factors explaining the return
What has changed between then and now? Five factors, layered on top of each other, have created the opening that pirate networks in Puntland are exploiting.
The first factor is the de-facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Somali piracy networks are not single-purpose criminal enterprises; they operate across multiple illicit economies, including smuggling through the strait. Denied that revenue stream, criminal financiers are redirecting toward hijacking and ransom.
Second, the broader economic fallout from the US-Israel war on Iran has simultaneously pushed up fuel and food prices across the Horn of Africa, straining coastal communities in Puntland that have historically supplied both recruits and logistical support. When people have no income and no prospects, maritime crime becomes an employer of last resort.
Third, US cuts to development assistance and reductions in UN programme funding have eliminated what limited economic alternatives existed. Counter-piracy experts have long argued that sustainable suppression requires onshore investment — in livelihoods, governance, local institutions. Strip that away, and deterrents at sea become harder to sustain.
The fourth is US disengagement. Washington has reduced its naval contribution to counter-piracy and, more damagingly, has likely scaled back the support that gave the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) and its counter-piracy task force its genuine operational bite. On paper, CMF remains a 47-nation partnership. In practice, its effectiveness has always depended on American backbone — and that backbone is being quietly pulled.
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