Christian Bueger

Tag Archives: Maritime Security


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A Contact Group for the Strait of Hormuz?

The question of how to restore safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most pressing issues for the global economy.

Much of the debate has focused on the control system Iran intends to establish and the role the United States may play, with the U.S. President indicating a willingness to collaborate. Whatever the outcome, uncertainty is likely to remain high, suggesting that these arrangements alone may not be sufficient to alter the risk assessments of the shipping industry.

This underscores the continued importance of exploring whether and how multilateral arrangements can contribute. More than 30 states have expressed their willingness to support a multilateral solution and have begun coordinating their positions.

The UN Security Council, which could provide both mandate and legitimacy for such an endeavor, has so far been unable to reach agreement. A draft resolution by Bahrain calling for close coordination among affected states was put to a vote on the 7th of April, but China and Russia exercised their vetoes, citing concerns that the proposed authorizations could be misinterpreted and risk further escalation. Discussions in the Council are expected to continue.

A more practical question therefore arises: if a coalition of over 30 states seeks to act, what form could this take? A central element would be an international coordination mechanism. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has proposed the establishment of an international contact group.

Contact groups are proven crisis management instruments

Contact groups are a proven instrument in international crisis management and have demonstrated their value in maritime contexts. Notably, much of the success in countering piracy off the coast of Somalia between 2008 and 2012 can be attributed to the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS).

Their utility lies in enabling strategic alignment, operational coordination, the development of legal pathways, and the preparation of decisions within formal international organizations. They help depoliticize cooperation by focusing on concrete, manageable issues, thereby limiting the impact of broader geopolitical tensions.

They are also agile and impose a relatively low administrative burden. Their flexible participation formats allow for engagement with industry and civil society ensuring that relevant expertise is incorporated.

How the group could work in practice

A Contact Group for the Strait of Hormuz could be mandated to serve several purposes:

  • To provide reassurance to the shipping industry and help stabilize risk assessments;
  • to deter hostile actions and provocations against shipping, including in the cyber and subsea domains;
  • to ensure the Strait remains free of mine-related risks;
  • to coordinate and deconflict naval operations among participating states
  • to address divergences in the interpretation of the law of the sea
  • to support long-term safety arrangements, including consideration of a dedicated treaty
  • to identify solutions for recovering the maritime ecosystems from war-related pollution

Broad but functional participation will be essential. This could include:

  • States with a high interest in freedom of navigation in the Strait, and states that currently operate naval forces in the region, including through multi-national naval forces (e.g. EUNVAFOR Operation Atalanta, or Combined Maritime Forces);
  • international shipping industry associations, including International Chamber of Shipping, BIMCO, INTERTANKO, and INTERCARGO;
  • international organizations with a relevant mandate, including the International Maritime Organization (IMO), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UN Environment Programme, UN Institute for Disarmament Research, UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), World Food Programme (WFP);
  • regional organizations active in maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, European Union, Djibouti Code of Conduct, and Indian Ocean Commission
  • selected non-governmental organizations, including seafarer organizations, as appropriate.

Drawing on the CGPCS model, the group could be structured around a plenary and several technical working groups. A plenary with a rotating chair, meeting quarterly, could provide strategic direction and issue communiqués to enhance transparency. Possible technical working groups could focus on operational naval coordination and deconfliction (WG1), information sharing, industry engagement and communication (WG2), legal harmonization, bringing together law of the sea experts from foreign ministries (WG3), and environmental challenges arising from the war (WG4).

Given that the United Kingdom has already convened a group of states, it could take the lead in establishing the contact group and proposing initial terms of reference, drawing on the CGPCS experience. While a Security Council mandate would be desirable, there is no need to wait for one—though efforts to secure such a mandate should continue.


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A moment of relief: What’s next for the Strait of Hormuz?

The decision by the United States not to further escalate its conflict with Iran, alongside a two-week ceasefire, has offered the global economy a brief moment of relief. Both sides have declared victory. Yet as details of the agreement slowly emerge—and remain subject to further negotiation—it is clear that the outlook for global trade is mixed.

A temporary arrangement has been reached for the Strait of Hormuz, one of the central arteries of the global economy. This narrow waterway is critical not only for energy flows but also for the food security of billions. What happens here reverberates far beyond the region.

Since the onset of hostilities involving the United States and Israel, Iran has exercised tight control over navigation through the strait. It has threatened to target vessels linked to its adversaries while guaranteeing safe passage to only a limited number of ships, primarily those transporting Iranian oil to Asia. In practice, the strait has been neither fully closed nor fully open.

The ceasefire appears to ease immediate tensions. Iran is expected to lift its direct threats against commercial shipping. However, it will retain significant control over access. Rather than restoring full freedom of navigation, the emerging “new normal” places decisions over passage largely at Iran’s discretion.

Tehran has also indicated its intention to impose transit fees as a means of compensation for the war. While international law does not permit direct charges for passage, it does allow fees for services rendered (see UNCLOS para. 26). This legal grey area could provide Iran with substantial leverage. Much will depend on the details—particularly the criteria used to determine which vessels are allowed to transit and under what conditions. For now, those rules remain opaque.

A process at the International Maritime Organization will likely be required to puzzle out the details and offer the industry reassurance. How this impacts the risk assessments of the shipping industry remains to be seen. Many shippers are likely to pause their transits and wait to see how the situation develops.

Higher transit costs, increased insurance premiums, and persistent uncertainty will likely raise the price of shipping. Countries heavily dependent on this route will bear the burden, effectively absorbing part of the economic cost of the conflict and essentially paying for Trump’s war.

Diplomatically, the ceasefire marks a success for regional actors, notably Pakistan, which acted as the facilitator, backed by its partners Egypt, Turkiye and Saud Arabia – increasingly known as the Muslim Quad. We are likely to hear more from this new grouping and its strategy not only in the Gulf but also in the broader Indian Ocean.

At the same time, we are facing a moment that underscores the weakening of the multilateral system. The UN Security Council met only hours before the ceasefire was agreed to vote on a resolution that would have implied a broader global agreement for the Strait of Hormuz.

It would have provided the foundation for a multilateral mechanism, such as a contact group, that could provide safety in the Strait in the long run. China and Russia used their veto. The failure to adopt a broader agreement highlights growing geopolitical fragmentation. Yet, a Security Council resolution is not fully off the table. After this failure, restarting negotiations will require some time.

The result is not a return to normality, but the emergence of a more politicized and fragile maritime environment—one in which chokepoints are increasingly weaponized and politically controlled. Freedom of navigation will become more and more limited.


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Upcoming UN Security Council resolution on Strait of Hormuz

The first UN Security Council resolution (2817) on the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz was historic: 135 states sponsored the document calling for an end to attacks on shipping. Ten days of intense negotiations later, the Council is expected to vote on a follow-up resolution today.

According to the Security Council Report, the resolution calls on states “to coordinate efforts, defensive in nature, commensurate to the circumstances, to contribute to ensuring the safety and security of navigation across the Strait of Hormuz, including through the escort of merchant and commercial vessels, and to deter attempts to close, obstruct, or otherwise interfere with international navigation”.

That means that the Council will not explicitly authorize the use of force, as some states called for. Its focus on defensive measures is useful, as it does not risk escalation.

The resolution will serve as a solid foundation for a future arrangement for governing the strait, which can be put in place once a ceasefire is agreed. This will be led by the 40-nation-plus coalition of states that have already agreed to contribute to the protection of shipping in the region.

A contact group will likely be the best format to organize the coalition, to enhance military coordination, coordination with the shipping industry, and to harmonize legal understandings.

As I have argued in a recent commentary for EUobserver, the EU could play a leading role, given its experience with organizing multilateral naval operations, and the strong information-sharing infrastructure it has in place.

All of this only can be activated once hostilities end. It’s important to have solid planning already now.


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Media roundup – situation in Strait of Hormuz

Transit through one of the global economy’s most central water way – the Strait of Hormuz – continues to be limited. Since the war started on 28th of February, only few ships have gone through the Strait. These were either directly linked to Iran, or countries negotiated individual passages with the government. The economic impact has been globally felt and the crisis effects small island states and least developed countries in the most dramatic way.

Over the past days, I have spoken to different media to help publics to understand better why it is difficult to return to normal traffic in the Strait. The strait cannot just be opened but require a multi-stage process. Diplomatic solutions are key to develop a governance arrangement that can provide some level of physical protection for shipping and reassurance. A UN mandate would be crucial to ensure impartiality and legitimacy. Highlights include conversations with Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Wall Street Journal, and France24. See the full overview here.


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How can maritime flows return in the Strait of Hormuz? New commentary

The Strait of Hormuz is vital for the global economy, the longer it stays closed the higher the risks. Yet, returning to normal will be difficult.

In my most recent commentary, published with Global Observatory, I look at mid-term scenarios. A UN Security Council mandate, or even a maritime UN Peacekeeping mission, could be key. Leadership from the EU will be needed.

Read here: https://theglobalobservatory.org/2026/03/strait-of-hormuz-time-for-a-maritime-peacekeeping-operation/


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Strategic Foresight Diplomacy in Action – The EU-Indonesia dialogue.

It was a pleasure to contribute to an innovative EU-Indonesia track 1.5 dialogue this week.

Track 1.5 dialogues are a conventional tool in diplomacy. In Southeast Asia they are even one of the main modes of diplomatic negotiations – known as the ‘ASEAN way’. Mixing participants from ministries of foreign affairs, governmental research organizations and independent think tanks, their primarily objective is usually trust and confidence building, developing interpersonal networks, but also epistemic alignments: open exchanges on problem interpretation, current and planned policies, recent developments and plans. Chatham house rules are usually applied and participants are asked to make frank remarks or ask critical questions, which could otherwise violate diplomatic conventions. If and how such events are effective and trickle down to formal track 1.0 diplomatic negotiations is often debated, but in the end very difficult to measure.

This week I participated in the EU-Indonesia track 1.5 dialogue. Mainly concerned about the implications of the recent comprehensive trade treaty, the event was noteworthy as the EU tried out a new format: strategic foresight. In what might be described as “foresight diplomacy”, the focus of the event was on exchanges on foresight expertise.


Strategic foresight is a planning approach that has become increasingly popular in the defense sector, economic policy making, but also the commercial sector. As a methodology it is focused on the management of risk by identifying mega trends and scenarios. Contrary to forecasting, multiple futures are anticipated and evaluated for their plausibility in participative processes. The goal of planning is preparedness and resilience. Both the OECD and NATO have developed important guidelines for carrying out such analyses and the EU and Indonesia, but also many others, have developed foresight capacities in their diplomatic services.

Foresight diplomacy is focused on the systematic exchange not only of experience, but also the outcomes of foresight exercises. Comparisons between meta trends, scenarios and resulting gaps and planning priorities serve as the basis for not only epistemic alignment, but also identifying common interests and collective action space.

According to the organizers the event that I attended was one of the first in which the EU, led by the foresight unit in the European External Action Service and its partner – Forward Global –, tested this approach. While there’s a risk that foresight diplomacy dialogues become methods driven and technocratic, they might be extremely useful to overcome the short-termism and news focus that too often prevails at track 1.5 dialogues. I look forward to following how the EU continues to advance this innovative form of diplomacy.


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Joining forces with the Charles Telfair Centre in Mauritius

Professional news: I have joined the Mauritius based Charles Telfair Centre as an Associate Fellow from February this year. The Center is one of the leading cross-cutting think tanks in the Western Indian Ocean working on the challenges of Small Island Developing States and regional governance issues.

In my role, I will support the center’s ambitions in the area of regional ocean governance and maritime security. We will focus in particular on how maritime security governance structures in the region can be strengthened, persistent blue crimes and safety risks can be encountered, and increasing geopolitical risks can be mitigated. One focus area will also be the future governance of the Chagos archipelago. We also hope to form relevant expert networks within and beyond the region.

Do not hesitate to get in touch if you want to discuss opportunities for collaboration.


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Looking back at 2025

Time for a brief look back at 2025. Here is what made this year special:

  1. Playing Tejo, an ancient throwing game and the national sport of Colombia, in Bogota with Andres Julian Trujillo Rosero after an intense strategic foresight event with the Colombian Navy.
  2. Wandering the streets of New York in the early mornings after a non-stop flight from Singapore, staying awake to be fresh for my briefing at the UN Security Council’s high-level debate on maritime security.
  3. Receiving a crystal ball as a gift in Singapore, which significantly improved my approach to strategic foresight.
  4. Meeting the pink pigeon, Mauritius’ national endangered bird, in one of the national parks while conducting research on maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean.
  5. Seeing our edited volume on global ocean regions in print completing an amazing intellectual journey with Elizabeth Mendenhall, Bec Strating and others.
  6. Recognizing how many varieties of tuna dishes one can make while visiting The Maldives National University, thanks to Athaulla (‘Atho’) Rasheed.
  7. Launching my new newsletter ‘Turbulent Seas’, although fewer issues were published in 2025 than originally envisioned. Watch that space!
  8. Enjoying the Abu Dhabi sunset while sipping a cold brew with Brendon J. Cannon after a presentation at TRENDS Research & Advisory.
  9. Seeing my first article published in French, though this would not have been possible without great translators at Diplomatie.
  10. Visiting the Taj Mahal ahead of the National Maritime Foundation- NMF’s Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue.
  11. Recognizing that I have given close to 60 talks in 2025, including briefings to the European Council, the European Parliament, and NATO’s Operation Policy Committee. 2026 will be focused on writing!

To everyone I had the privilege of meeting in 2025: thank you for making it extraordinary. Excited to see what 2026 brings…


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Talk at Oslo Maritime Security Seminar

Yesterday, I attended the 20th Oslo Maritime Security Seminar – the Nordic’s major industry event on the topic.

With more than 300 attendees, highlights included discussions on grey zone strategies, the shadow fleet, and the challenges linked to growing incidents of GNSS spoofing and jamming. I was invited to discuss the state of maritime security governance and presented six observations. Here in brief:

  • The agenda is evolving rapidly—from terrorism to piracy to smuggling to today’s grey zone threats (cyber, infrastructure attacks, state provocations).
  • Maritime security is now multidimensional—we’re thinking beyond surface and include subsea infrastructure, space, and cyber. That’s creating new governance complexities.
  • A new wave of privatization is underway, driven by robotics, new sensors, AI and data fusion. It’s democratizing maritime domain awareness but also creating new dependencies.
  • There’s a “coastguard revolution”—navies are stepping back from constabulary work, coastguards are stepping up, and this has major implications for maritime investment.
  • Regional cooperation is intensifying as neighbors work closer together. But so is the risk of fragmented regional governance.
  • The UN is gaining real momentum on maritime security—three high-level meetings this year, 120+ states in agreement.

You can read the script of me intervention here.

A personal highlight: Taking the stage at a comedy club – the venue of the seminar – clearly opened new career ideas.


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Visit to Indian maritime security center

Continuing my tour of the world’s leading maritime domain awareness centers, I had the pleasure of visiting the Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) last week. The center is an initiative by the Indian Navy to improve information sharing and understanding of maritime security dynamics.

IFC-IOR is modeled after the Singapore Navy’s Information Fusion Center. It is staffed by Indian Navy personnel as well as International Liaison Officers from the Indian Ocean region from currently 15 countries. Closely linked to India’s national maritime fusion center (IMAC), the IFC-IOR’s backbone is an information fusion platform named ‘Mantra’.

Overall, the center performs four main functions:

  • It provides reports on maritime security incidents at regular intervals to provide accurate information on patterns of maritime security threats with a focus on the Indian Ocean region as well as the Gulf of Guinea.
  • The center provides support to regional maritime operations by the Indian Navy, including incidents of piracy or search and rescue missions.
  • It engages in regional capacity building activities and training through workshops on maritime domain awareness and information sharing.
  • Confidence building and naval diplomacy through building relations with international and regional maritime security forces is another major task.

In acting as a regional maritime information clearinghouse, high-level reporting is currently the IFC-IOR’s strongest contribution to the regional maritime security architecture.

Like other centers and platforms, the IFC-IOR faces the challenges of how to better integrate with other initiatives, including the four centers that form SHADE’s Single Information Framework. Another challenge lies in how to automate work, and move from information sharing to enhancing operations through prediction.

In regional terms, the center will also need to strengthen its role in supporting coordinated regional maritime security operations, including those led by its neighbors or organized in the framework of the Regional Maritime Security Architecture.