🔊 The incoming Council membership – featuring Greece (controlling 17% of global maritime capacity), Denmark (home to Maersk), Panama (world’s largest flag state), Pakistan (regional naval power), and Somalia (maritime security success story) – creates a unique concentration of maritime expertise alongside the permanent members.
💡 This “de facto Maritime Security Council” arrives at a critical moment. From attacks on commercial shipping to cybersecurity threats and environmental challenges, maritime security threats are evolving at an unprecedented pace. No nation can ensure maritime security alone.
Key questions for the Council to discuss: 🔎 Establishing a dedicated maritime security mechanism within the UN system 🔎 Improving frameworks for information sharing and protecting critical maritime infrastructure 🔎 Addressing and coordinating responses to environmental threats in maritime domains
➡️ Read my full analysis on how this unique Council composition could reshape global maritime security governance here.
🌊 The maritime security architecture in the Western Indian Ocean has developed new pace since the emergence of Houthi attacks on commercial shipping and the resurgence of Somali piracy activities last year. This week I attended the naval coordination SHADE conference in Bahrain, where these critical developments took center stage.
SHADE in full work mode
🤝 SHADE serves as a vital interface between the complex network of multinational and independent naval forces and the shipping industry. The EU’s Operation Atalanta and the US led Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) co-host this forum which has evolved from its original focus on piracy to become a comprehensive annual dialogue.
📊 It has now upscaled activities and launched three working groups dedicated to intelligence, information sharing, and operations. The key objectives are to give better advice to shipping, improve flow of information, and develop better emergency response coordination, including oil spill prevention.
SHADE is working towards what it calls a ‘Single Information Environment’. This could streamline information flow across the six information sharing centers focused on the region. A corner piece is a center started in 2024 – the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) – which supports the CMF.
The European Union’s continued commitment
🇪🇺 The European Union continues to demonstrate strong commitment to regional maritime security. Operation Atalanta’s mandate has been renewed for two years, and its sister operation, Aspides, is expected to be extended until 2026.
There are expectations that the two EU operations will be merged soon. Anticipating this merger, the EU has rebranded its information sharing center. It now runs under the name of Maritime Security Center Indian Ocean (MSCIO), serves both operations and has a brand new website.
CMF and regional contributions
🌏 CMF, which is organized in different task forces and remains focused on nonstate threats on the high seas, has expanded its membership significantly, turning it into an important umbrella organization under US leadership.
🌏 Regional leadership in maritime security has also grown impressively: India has emerged as a pivotal maritime security provider; the Indian Ocean Commission’s two centers have become key operational pillars, coordinating responses among Eastern African states; and the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCOC) has evolved into a more effective capacity building coordination mechanism.
⚓ As I highlighted in my presentation: Though this new momentum is encouraging, maritime security threats persist, and shipping attacks continue to pose challenges. Success requires sustained engagement and investment with a long-term perspective.
My latest analysis, published with the Center for Maritime Strategy, highlights the intricate web of maritime security challenges in the Western Indian Ocean. From piracy to drug trafficking, the region faces diverse threats requiring coordinated international response. Despite numerous initiatives, a cohesive security architecture remains elusive due to competing visions and priorities among stakeholders.
I emphasize the crucial role of the Contact Group on Illicit Maritime Activities (CGIMA) as a neutral platform for strategic dialogue. While a unified structure is unlikely, CGIMA offers hope for better coordination and inclusivity. The goal: navigate complexity through open communication and collaboration, ensuring a safer Western Indian Ocean through collective action.
The First Sea Lord’s Seapower Conference is the Royal Navy’s annual flagship event, and I had the pleasure to attend and speak at this years iteration.
The 2024 edition was titled “Future navy: Maritime in the 2040s” and the debate firmly focused on the question of what mid-term challenges the Royal Navy faces and through what posture it could address them.
The event was co-organized with the Council on Geostrategy. The Council, founded in 2001, is a relatively young think tanks — if compared to the traditional British intellectual power houses, such as RUSI or Chatham House. The Council’s mission is “to strengthen Britain and re-assert [its] leadership” and it wants to “promote robust ideas” to boost the countries “discursive, diplomatic and military power”.
In a new commentary published with RUSI, I argue that the number of multi-national operations in the Western Indian Ocean region requires better coordination. I show which operations are currently active, and that new coordination tools, such as an improved SHADE mechanism are required. Read it here.
In a new commentary published with SafeSeas I reflect on the current wave of piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia. The pirates have shown considerable activity over the past weeks, and use the current Red Sea crisis as a window of opportunity. Contrary to optimistic voices that suggest that the current counter-piracy structures can cope with this, I take a more critical stance, and argue that a strong signal is required to prevent further escalation.
The seabed is rapidly becoming a new space of concern in security politics. In Europe, largely triggered by the 2022 sabotage of he Nord Stream pipelines, but also investments by Russia in subsea capabilities, NATO countries are reevaluating their dependency on subsea infrastructures such as pipelines and data and electricity cables.
As part of their EU presidency, the Spanish Navy hosted a Forum focused on the issue on November, 16th at naval headquarters in Madrid. Titled the “Seabed, a new area of interest and dispute”, 150 participants, including high level representatives from all major European navies, discussed the importance of the seabed, and different responses.
The first panel focused on the strategic picture, deep seabed mining and subsea data cables. In the second panels, the navies of Spain, Italy and France provided an overview of the defense and coordination projects they are currently developing. The French representative showed how the navy is implementing its dedicated seabed strategy, while Italy discussed how their response is structured by technological innovation, maritime stakeholder communities, a legal review and the creation of a new coordination center.
In my contribution to panel 1, I firstly argued for the need to think maritime security in dimensional terms. I then demonstrated how substantively our dependency on the seabed has been accelerating in the past two decades, a trend that will continue with the green energy transition is unfolding. Two make that point, I provided a review of how the seabed has been used throughout history. I then investigated the hypothetical landscape of threats based on our recent article on the issue. I ended in an evaluation of current European responses and its challenges.
The main responses are led by NATO and the EU. NATO has developed a coordination cell in its headquarters which organizes a stakeholder network described as ‘community of trust’. At NATO Maritime Command a center for critical infrastructure protection is being developed which will operate in a similar way as the NATO Shipping Center to enhance information sharing and coordination with industry.
The EU is currently evaluating the vulnerability of subsea infrastructures, and has recently launched its EU Maritime Security Strategy that entails significant plans for infrastructure protection. A key actor driving the agenda is the European Defense Agency.
More efforts will be needed, however, in improving maritime domain awareness and subsea awareness, reliable information sharing and standards for the self-protection by the industry.
In a new commentary published in The Conversation I reflect on the recent reports of Russian spying activities in the North Sea and Baltic Sea region. While there are not many news in these reports, I argue that it implies to pay more attention to the North Sea as a critical security space, and to go beyond surveillance and invest in repair capacities to reduce the threat to infrastructures. Read the commentary here.
The joint management of maritime zones is often seen as a leading vision for how the oceans can be better governed. The African Integrated Maritime Strategy outlined a vision of shared Exclusive Economic Zones for blue economy goals. Others propagate Marine Peace Parks – jointly managed zones which would allow to overcome border disputes and establish synergies between marine protection and maritime security goals. Also the BBNJ negotiations, highlight that joined management might be the future of ocean governance. Are there model cases, that would allow us to see how joint management might work (or fail)?
In 2012 Seychelles and Mauritius signed a bilateral treaty agreeing on a joined up management for their extended continental shelf. It is today known as the Joined Management Area (JMA). Today I had the pleasure to have a conversation with the project manager, Francesca Adrienne, that has helped to get the JMA running.
The establishment of the JMA is supported by a UNDP led project, funded under the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). This capacity building initiative, as Francesca Adrienne told me, has assisted in the establishment of a governance structure, an ongoing marine spatial planning processes, a joint approach to maritime control and surveillance and a shared IT infrastructure for managing ocean data.
The two countries also benefitted from trainings, in law, data processing and governance. The project, which ends in April this year, also provided the framework for three exploration missions in the zone, collecting oceanographic data , and studying biodiversity and the life of mammals.
I also learned how difficult it is to conduct capacity building, which echoes our earlier studies related to maritime security. A key struggle is how to get everyone together to act concertedly and harmonize laws. It also concerns how to retain staff that has been trained, and how to maintain the infrastructures build in the future.
We also discussed more specific problems in shared marine management. This includes how to align the marine spatial planning process in the JMA with those in the Exclusive Economic Zones of the two countries.
It also concerns how to integrate the JMA within broader ocean governance in the region, including the maritime security architecture build through the Indian Ocean Commission’s MASE project. Since this architecture also deals with some of the main risks to biodiversity in the zone — illegal fishing, and shipping accidents, there is quite some synergies.
The JMA outlines how we might move joined ocean management forward. Many lessons will be drawn from it in the future. Whether and how the JMA will contribute to ocean health and maritime security, needs to be seen. It is after all an arrangement that deals with the seabed only, and it is driven by the goal to exploit resources.
While no oil and gas has yet been found in this remote part of the world, nor are deep seabed minerals in abundance, it is worrying that neither Seychelles nor Mauritius have taken a stance towards deep sea mining, or under what conditions they would exploit any other seabed resources.
While travelling, one encounters quite some memorials; they commemorate battles, heroes, accidents or disasters. During my visit to Eastern Africa, I had recently the opportunity to visit the Genocide memorial in Kigali commemorating the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the memorial of the 2013 Westgate shopping attack in Nairobi’s Karura Forrest. These are memorials of human catastrophes and sites of contemplating how to prevent similar events..
Yet, in the age of the anthropocene, also animals face horrendous catastrophes and entire species are dying out. How shall we commemorate them?
A recent visit to the Ol Pejeta conservancy brought me to an interesting site. The park has as one of its many attractions a rhino cemetery. The majority of rhinos buried at the site, fell victim to poachers. They were hunted down for their horns. It sends a powerful reminder of the tragic consequences of the poaching crisis.
But perhaps most important is another grave. The resting ground of Sudan, the last male of his species, the Northern White Rhino. It is the first ecocide memorial, I have been present at so far.
